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INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that the George W. Bush Administration made a ma-
jor effort to expand (or restore, depending upon one’s perspective) 
the President’s power with respect to the other branches of govern-
ment.1  In particular, the Bush Administration attempted to streng-
then the President’s power to withhold documents from Congress 
and the courts under the doctrine of executive privilege,2 which had 
taken quite a beating during the Clinton Administration.3  Near the 
end of President Bush’s first term, he won a major victory when the 
Supreme Court ruled that he did not even have to assert executive 
privilege in order to protect from disclosure documents relating to 
the National Energy Policy Development Group, chaired by Vice 
President Cheney (and commonly known as the “Energy Task 
Force”).4  The President managed to avoid a major confrontation 
with Congress over executive privilege until after the 2006 election, 
when the Democrats regained control of the House of Representa-
tives and began to conduct more vigorous oversight of the executive 
branch. 
 
  Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. 
 1 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY (2007); Cynthia Farina, False Comfort 
and Impossible Promises:  Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 357, 359–61 (2010) (arguing that the ascendancy of the “personal” presiden-
cy has forced Congress and federal agencies into roles that support the president’s agen-
da); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws:  Internal Legal Constraints on Executive 
Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1564–66 (2007) (considering the need for legal constraints 
on executive action, in light of the Bush Administration’s policies on detention of terror-
ism suspects and Congress’s accession to them). 
 2 See Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived?:  Secrecy and Conflict During the Bush Presidency, 
52 DUKE L.J. 403, 405 (2002) (“President Bush has exercised the privilege in an attempt 
to reestablish what he perceives as a more correct balance of powers between the legisla-
tive and executive branches.”). 
 3 See generally Jonathan Turley, Paradise Lost:  The Clinton Administration and the Erosion of 
Executive Privilege, 60 MD. L. REV. 205 (2001) (evaluating what remains of executive privi-
lege “in the aftermath of Clinton’s failed assertions”). 
 4 See Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 390–91 (2004) (noting that district courts 
can “explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege, when they 
are asked to enforce against the Executive Branch unnecessarily broad subpoenas”). 
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This change of power coincided with one of the major scandals of 
the Bush Administration, the Attorney General’s decision to fire nine 
United States Attorneys for what many believed to be politically moti-
vated reasons.5  The House Judiciary Committee began hearings into 
the dismissals and sought witnesses and documents from both the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the White House.6  Although the 
White House offered to produce some of the requested documents 
and provide testimony under a number of restrictions, the committee 
was not satisfied with the response because of the restrictions on the 
testimony and the fact that the White House refused to provide any 
documents relating to communications within the White House.7  
The committee then issued subpoenas to (among others) former 
White House Counsel Harriet Miers for testimony and White House 
Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten for the internal White House docu-
ments.8  In response to the subpoenas, the President, based upon ad-
vice from the DOJ, asserted a claim of executive privilege and refused 
to produce additional documents or allow Miers to testify.9  After fur-
ther negotiations proved fruitless, the House voted to cite Miers and 
Bolten for contempt of Congress.10  The Attorney General, acting 
pursuant to long-standing DOJ practice, refused to proceed with any 
further action on the contempt of Congress citations.11 
Then the Judiciary Committee did something that Congress had 
done only once before (and not since the Watergate era); it filed a 
lawsuit in federal court seeking judicial enforcement of the subpoe-
nas.12  The DOJ argued that the subpoenas were subject to a claim of 
absolute privilege, and it moved to dismiss the suit on the ground 
that it was non-justiciable.13  District Judge John Bates rejected the ex-
ecutive’s argument that the suit was non-justiciable and partially 
granted the committee’s motion for summary judgment.14  The judge 
did not order disclosure of all the documents, nor did he order Miers 
to answer every question; instead he ordered the White House to 
 
 5 See Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 57–58 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting 
potential political motives behind the U.S. Attorney firings). 
 6 Id. at 58. 
 7 Id. at 60. 
 8 Id. at 61. 
 9 Id. at 61–62. 
 10 Id. at 63. 
 11 Id. at 63–64. 
 12 Id. at 64.  The only previous case in which Congress had filed for civil enforcement of 
subpoenas to the executive branch was Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activi-
ties v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 13 Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 65, 100. 
 14 Id. at 108. 
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produce a detailed description of the documents being withheld, and 
he ordered Miers to give sworn testimony during which her counsel 
could interpose objections to individual questions on the ground of 
executive privilege.15  The court then suggested that, now that the 
President’s claim of absolute privilege had been denied, the parties 
return to the usual process of negotiation and accommodation and 
work out a compromise.16  The parties reached such a compromise 
agreement, but only after the change of administrations.17 
As frequently happens after incidents in which the President over-
reaches in making claims of unilateral executive authority, there was 
a substantial scholarly backlash.  Two commentators have argued that 
Congress should make more vigorous use of its inherent contempt 
power and arrest officials who assert the President’s claim of execu-
tive privilege.18  A third scholar has argued that Congress should have 
the absolute right to determine what documents the executive 
branch must produce and that courts should give conclusive effect to 
Congress’s own resolution of the President’s claims of executive privi-
lege.19  Finally, two others have argued that courts should intervene to 
resolve executive privilege disputes even more aggressively than 
Judge Bates did and not defer to the traditional negotiation-
accommodation process between Congress and the executive 
branch.20 
This Article contends that all of these arguments are overreactions 
to the excessive claims of privilege during the Bush Administration 
and that the traditional negotiation-accommodation process between 
 
 15 Id. at 106, 108. 
 16 Id. at 106. 
 17 See Carrie Johnson, Deal Clears Rove, Miers to Discuss Prosecutor Firings, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 
2009, at A08 (reporting that former President Bush acted “at the urging of the Obama 
administration, and in consideration of the executive branch interests at stake” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 18 See Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1152 
(2009) (suggesting that each House’s Sergeant-at-Arms could arrest contemnors and hold 
them in custody); Michael A. Zuckerman, Note, The Court of Congressional Contempt, 25 J.L. 
& POL. 41, 44 (2009) (same). 
 19 See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers:  Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 
489, 493–96 (2007) (“This Article concludes that there is no such thing as a constitution-
ally based executive privilege, and courts—in the face of executive privilege claims—
should order compliance with any statutorily authorized demands for executive branch 
information.”). 
 20 See Gia B. Lee, The President’s Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 203 (2008) (advocating 
that a court conduct “a searching review of the extent of [the executive’s confidentiali-
ty] . . . interest in each case”); David A. O’Neil, The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (2007) (“Courts must play some substantive role in a cohe-
rent system for resolving interbranch battles over information.”). 
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Congress and the executive branch remains the best way to resolve 
inter-branch disputes over access to information, as long as the courts 
remain ready to reject claims of absolute constitutional prerogative 
from both sides and to push the parties back to the bargaining table.  
First, the contention that there are historical precedents for the use 
of Congress’s inherent contempt power against officials who assert 
the President’s claim of executive privilege21 is incorrect.  Not only is 
there no precedent for such use of Congress’s contempt power, in 
over 200 years of innumerable contentious disputes over congres-
sional access to executive branch information, Congress has never as-
serted that it has such authority.  Moreover, claims that Congress 
needs such power to enforce its investigative demands22 are belied by 
the consistent success (indeed, some might say too much success) 
Congress has had in forcing disclosures from the executive branch 
since the Watergate era during the Nixon Administration.  Second, 
arguments in favor of Congress’s absolute authority to determine the 
validity of an executive privilege claim are no more consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent and our constitutional history than the 
President’s arguments in favor of absolute privilege.  Giving Congress 
such absolute power would only aggravate the current tendency for 
Congress to use its investigative power for partisan purposes.  Finally, 
courts should not play a more active role in resolving information 
disputes between Congress and the President, partly because of the 
difficulty a court has in assessing the needs of the branches given the 
virtually infinite variety of information disputes, but more important-
ly because a court would have no way of determining which among 
the vast array of possible conditions should be imposed on the disclo-
sure of documents to Congress.  Courts should leave that to the polit-
ical branches, which have proved to be wonderfully adept at fashion-
ing a wide variety of terms and conditions to resolve information 
disputes. 
This Article begins in Part I with a discussion of the competing 
constitutional powers of the political branches:  Congress’s investiga-
tive power and its authority to enforce subpoenas and the President’s 
right to preserve the confidentiality of certain types of executive 
 
 21 See Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1084 (suggesting that legistlative contempt power has had “a 
key role in resolving contested questions of the allocation of power within the federal 
government”). 
 22 See id. at 1145 (arguing that Congress must have access to information from the executive 
branch in order to uncover “executive branch malevolence and incompetence”); Zuck-
erman, supra note 18, at 63 (emphasizing that “Congress should in certain cases resort to 
its direct power to punish for contempt,” since otherwise “the Executive’s refusal to pros-
ecute may result in unremedied obstruction to the legislative process”). 
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branch information.  This Part examines the history and judicial 
precedent concerning each power and then explains the negotiation-
accommodation process that typically resolves conflicts between the 
two powers.  This Part concludes with a description of the United 
States Attorneys investigation, which gave rise to the proposals to 
change the current process mentioned above.  Part II analyzes the ar-
guments in favor of Congress’s use of its inherent contempt power to 
arrest officials who assert the President’s claim of executive privilege.  
Part III deals with the arguments in favor of Congress’s conclusive au-
thority to resolve any disputes over executive privilege.  Finally, Part 
IV responds to the calls for more active judicial involvement in execu-
tive privilege disputes. 
I.  THE IMPLIED, BUT NOT ABSOLUTE, POWERS OF CONGRESS AND THE 
PRESIDENT 
To understand whether it is constitutionally permissible to utilize 
contempt of Congress in executive privilege disputes, it is first neces-
sary to explore the history of two implied powers under the Constitu-
tion:  first, Congress’s implied authority to investigate matters within 
its legislative power and punish with contempt of Congress those who 
fail to comply with its investigative demands, and second, the implied 
power of the executive branch to maintain the confidentiality of ex-
ecutive branch documents the disclosure of which would adversely 
affect the ability of the President to carry out his constitutionally as-
signed functions.  It is necessary to examine these powers in some 
depth in order to establish three important points about each power:  
(1) each power has a significant constitutional history dating back 
over 200 years; (2) each power has been expressly recognized by the 
Supreme Court as a power that flows from the Constitution; and (3) 
neither power is absolute; each must yield under certain circums-
tances to the conflicting powers of the other branches. 
A. Congress’s Investigative and Contempt Powers 
Congress derives its authority to compel the production of docu-
ments and testimony not from any provision of the Constitution that 
expressly authorizes congressional investigations, but rather from the 
general grant of legislative authority in Article I, section 1 of the Con-
stitution:  “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and 
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House of Representatives.”23  Congress’s implied power to investigate 
is based upon the understanding that, in order to legislate effectively, 
Congress must be able to investigate and examine the subjects of po-
tential legislation.24 
From the time of George Washington until the present day, Con-
gress has utilized this power to investigate scores of different subjects, 
including investigative oversight of the executive branch.25  For ex-
ample, during President Washington’s first term, a House committee 
investigated the ill-fated expedition of General Arthur St. Clair, in 
which over 600 soldiers were killed in an attack by Native Americans 
of the Ohio frontier.  The House committee was expressly authorized 
“to call for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to 
assist their inquiries.”26 
Notwithstanding the extensive history of congressional investiga-
tions during the nineteenth century, it took some time before the 
Supreme Court recognized the broad scope of Congress’s investiga-
tive power.  In the first significant Supreme Court case on this ques-
tion, Kilbourn v. Thompson,27 the Supreme Court took a very narrow 
reading of Congress’s investigative authority.28  Kilbourn arose in re-
sponse to a congressional investigation into the bankruptcy of a com-
pany, in which the United States had a substantial investment.29  A 
House committee subpoenaed Kilbourn because he was the manager 
 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  See generally CONGRESS INVESTIGATES:  A DOCUMENTED HISTORY 
1792–1974 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Roger Bruns eds., 1975) [hereinafter CONGRESS 
INVESTIGATES] (setting forth a detailed history of congressional investigations); ERNEST J. 
EBERLING, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS:  A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO INVESTIGATE AND PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT (1973) (1928) 
(discussing Congress’s power to investigate in connection with the Teapot Dome Scan-
dal); JOHN C. GRABOW, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS:  LAW AND PRACTICE (1988) (de-
scribing Congress’s power to investigate). 
 24 See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 
183 (Univ. Press of Kan. 4th ed. 1997) (1978) (noting that “courts have consistently held 
that the investigative power is available . . . to legislate [and] when a ‘potential’ for legisla-
tion exists”). 
 25 See generally CONGRESS INVESTIGATES, supra note 23 (setting forth a detailed history of 
congressional investigations). 
 26 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 493 (1792).  As we will see later, this investigation gave rise to one of 
the earliest disputes over executive assertion of a privilege to protect the confidentiality of 
documents sought by Congress.  See infra text accompanying notes 347–51. 
 27 103 U.S. 168 (1880). 
 28 See id. at 189 (noting that English precedent did not support Congress’s punishment of a 
private citizen for contempt, and deciding the case without determining whether such a 
power is a necessary one for legislative functioning); William P. Marshall, The Limits on 
Congress’s Authority to Investigate the President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 789 (2004) (stating 
that Kilbourn “rejected rather than affirmed Congress’s power to investigate”). 
 29 Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 171. 
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of a D.C. real estate pool in which the company was a participant.30  
However, Kilbourn refused to answer questions or produce subpoe-
naed documents on the ground that “if it could be shown in any way 
that the Government was interested in [the nature of his busi-
ness] . . . , or that his testimony would promote the interest of the 
Government in any way, he would tell everything about it.”31  When 
Kilbourn failed to comply with the committee’s subpoena the full 
House found him in contempt of Congress, and he was incarcerated 
in the District of Columbia jail.32 
Kilbourn was released from custody when a federal court granted 
his habeas corpus petition, and he sued the Speaker of the House, 
the members of the investigating committee, and the Sergeant-at-
Arms (Thompson) for false imprisonment.33  Kilbourn argued that, 
because the House had no power to punish him for contempt, his ar-
rest and imprisonment were unlawful, while the Sergeant-at-Arms 
contended that the contempt citation was lawful and a valid defense 
to the false imprisonment action.34  When the Supreme Court de-
cided the case, it first held that Congress’s authority was not absolute 
and unreviewable, but was subject to review by the courts.35  It empha-
sized that because of the “popular origin” and political nature of the 
Congress, 
[i]t is all the more necessary, therefore, that the exercise of power by this 
body, when acting separately from and independently of all other deposi-
tories of power, should be watched with vigilance, and when called in 
question before any other tribunal having the right to pass upon it that it 
should receive the most careful scrutiny.36 
Second, the Court held that Kilbourn’s imprisonment for contempt 
was unlawful because Congress had exceeded its authority by investi-
gating the private affairs of citizens, and because the matter under in-
vestigation was the subject of ongoing bankruptcy proceedings.37 
Most interestingly, the Court questioned whether Congress had a 
right to investigate and punish for contempt under any circums-
tances: 
We are of opinion that the right of the House of Representatives to pu-
nish the citizen for a contempt of its authority or a breach of its privileges 
 
 30 The Real Estate Pool—Kilbourn in Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1876, at 2. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 175. 
 33 Id. at 170. 
 34 Id. at 181. 
 35 Id. at 192. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 190–92. 
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can derive no support from the precedents and practices of the two 
Houses of the English Parliament, nor from the adjudged cases in which 
the English courts have upheld these practices.  Nor, taking what has fal-
len from the English judges, and especially the later cases on which we 
have just commented, is much aid given to the doctrine, that this power 
exists as one necessary to enable either House of Congress to exercise 
successfully their function of legislation.38 
The Court disclaimed, however, that this conclusion was part of its 
holding, since the “proposition is one which we do not propose to 
decide in the present case, because we are able to decide it without 
passing upon the existence or non-existence of such a power in aid of 
the legislative function.”39 
Kilbourn’s suggestion that Congress might not have the authority 
to compel production of documents and testimony was emphatically 
rejected in the 1927 case of McGrain v. Daugherty40 that arose out of 
Congress’s investigation of the Teapot Dome scandal, which con-
cerned alleged corruption in the leasing of oil fields that had been 
reserved for the exclusive use of the Navy.41  After lengthy Senate in-
vestigations in 1922 and 1923, the Senate moved on to investigate At-
torney General Harry Daugherty’s failure to prosecute those whose 
corruption had been revealed in the Senate investigations.42 
The purpose of the investigation was so “that the practices and de-
ficiencies which, according to the charges, were operating to prevent 
or impair its right administration might be definitely ascertained and 
that appropriate and effective measures might be taken to remedy or 
eliminate the evil.”43  The committee issued subpoenas to a number 
of witnesses including Mally S. Daugherty, the brother of the Attorney 
General.44  When Mally Daugherty twice refused to testify in response 
to Senate subpoenas, he was arrested by John McGrain, one of the 
Senate’s Deputy Sergeants-at-Arms.45 
Daugherty argued to the Supreme Court that the Constitution did 
not authorize Congress to issue subpoenas to a private person to re-
spond under penalty of contempt of Congress.46  The Supreme Court 
disagreed, however, and ruled that both Houses of Congress “pos-
sess[ed], not only such powers as are expressly granted to them by 
 
 38 Id. at 189. 
 39 Id. 
 40 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
 41 See CONGRESS INVESTIGATES, supra note 23, at 2385. 
 42 Marshall, supra note 28, at 794. 
 43 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 151. 
 44 Id. at 152. 
 45 Id. at 152–54. 
 46 Id. at 154. 
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the Constitution, but such auxiliary powers as are necessary and ap-
propriate to make the express powers effective.”47  The Court looked 
to the extensive history of legislative investigations in both England 
and the United States and concluded that, “[i]n actual legislative 
practice power to secure needed information by such means has long 
been treated as an attribute of the power to legislate.”48  Notwith-
standing the absence of an express constitutional clause authorizing 
subpoenas and the contempt power to enforce them, the Court held 
that “the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential 
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”49  In this partic-
ular instance, although the resolution authorizing the Senate investi-
gation did not expressly state that it was in aid of the legislation, it was 
appropriate to infer a legislative purpose to the investigation: 
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investi-
gation was to aid it in legislating; and we think the subject-matter was 
such that the presumption should be indulged that this was the real ob-
ject.  An express avowal of the object would have been better; but in view 
of the particular subject-matter was not indispensable.50 
The Court did emphasize, however, that Congress did not have the 
“power to inquire into private affairs and compel disclosures, but only 
with such limited power of inquiry as is shown to exist” to support its 
legislative function.51  The scope of the British Parliament’s investiga-
tory authority is not similarly cabined.52 
Even Congress’s investigative power over public affairs is not un-
limited.  The Supreme Court explained Congress’s need to link the 
investigative power to a particular legislative inquiry in Watkins v. 
United States.53  Watkins involved the appeal of a contempt of Congress 
conviction by a labor official who had refused to testify before the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities concerning the identity 
of persons who had formerly been associated with the Communist 
Party.54  The Court summarized the scope of the investigative power 
as follows: 
 
 47 Id. at 173. 
 48 Id. at 161. 
 49 Id. at 174. 
 50 Id. at 178. 
 51 Id. at 173–74. 
 52 See Howard R. Sklamberg, Investigation Versus Prosecution:  The Constitutional Limits on Con-
gress’s Power to Immunize Witnesses, 78 N.C. L. REV. 153, 181–83 (1999) (describing the Brit-
ish Parliament’s “unchecked power to issue subpoenas for information related to any top-
ic and to punish individuals for contempt”). 
 53 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
 54 Id. at 185–86. 
86 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
The power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legis-
lative process.  That power is broad.  It encompasses inquiries concerning 
the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed 
statutes.  It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political 
system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.  It 
comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to 
expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.55 
In reversing the defendant’s conviction for contempt of Congress, 
however, the Court focused on Congress’s need to connect the inves-
tigative power to a specific subject of potential legislative action: 
But, broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited.  There is no 
general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justi-
fication in terms of the functions of the Congress . . . . Nor is the Con-
gress a law enforcement or trial agency.  These are functions of the ex-
ecutive and judicial departments of government.  No inquiry is an end in 
itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the 
Congress.  Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandize-
ment of the investigators or to “punish” those investigated are indefensi-
ble.56 
The Court explained that Congress’s investigative authority must 
also yield to the demands of the Bill of Rights and that the need to 
establish a nexus between a congressional investigation and a specific 
subject of proposed legislation was particularly strong when an inves-
tigation might compromise those rights.57 
[T]he mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry 
in the face of the Bill of Rights.  The critical element is the existence of, 
and weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding 
disclosures from an unwilling witness.  We cannot simply assume, howev-
er, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that 
overbalances any private rights affected.  To do so would be to abdicate 
the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure 
that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual’s 
right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or as-
sembly.58 
Congress has at its disposal a number of means to enforce com-
pliance with its subpoenas for testimony and documents.  First, each 
House of Congress has inherent power to cite a disobedient witness 
for contempt of Congress and to direct the Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest 
the individual and imprison him until the individual agrees to comply 
with the congressional subpoena.  Second, the criminal contempt of 
Congress statute permits the Houses of Congress to cite an individual 
 
 55 Id. at 187. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 198–99. 
 58 Id. 
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for contempt of Congress and refer the citation to the U.S. Attorney 
for prosecution for criminal contempt of Congress and possible im-
prisonment in a federal prison.  Finally, Congress has authority to 
seek civil enforcement of a subpoena and obtain a court order direct-
ing an individual to testify or produce documents in compliance with 
a congressional subpoena. 
1. Congress’s Inherent Contempt Power 
From the very first decade of the Constitution, Congress took the 
position that it had the right to imprison individuals in order to en-
force certain constitutional prerogatives.  Congress used this inherent 
contempt power to enforce its subpoenas for testimony and docu-
ments and imprisoned contumacious witnesses until they complied 
with the subpoena.  The first use of Congress’s inherent contempt 
power against a defaulting witness took place in 1800 when a newspa-
per editor, William Duane, was ordered by Senate resolution to ap-
pear before the Senate and “make any proper defense for his con-
duct in publishing the aforesaid false, defamatory, scandalous, and 
malicious assertions and pretended information.”59  After initially ap-
pearing before the Senate, Duane refused to return on the ground 
that he would not receive a fair trial and was subsequently found to 
be in contempt of Congress and arrested and held in Senate custody 
for several weeks.60  Between 1795 and 1857, Congress initiated four-
teen inherent contempt actions, and in eight of those cases the con-
tumacious witness agreed to testify or produce documents after being 
arrested by the Sergeant-at-Arms.61 
Congress’s inherent contempt power extends to the imposition of 
what is essentially a civil contempt sanction on those who fail to 
comply with congressional subpoenas.62  Under this procedure, a 
committee may adopt a resolution to request the presiding officer of 
the chamber to issue an arrest warrant to be executed by the Sear-
gent-at-Arms, who will bring the witness before the bar of the House.63  
 
 59 2 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 355, at 1054 (1907). 
 60 Id. at 1055–56. 
 61 MORTON ROSENBERG & TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34097 
CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER:  LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 20 (2008). 
 62 See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 541–42 (1917) (noting that Congress’s implied 
power of contempt “does not embrace punishment for contempt as punishment”). 
 63 CARL BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS:  A STUDY OF THE PROSECUTIONS INITIATED BY THE 
COMMITTEE OF UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, 1945–1957, at 4 (1959); RONALD L. GOLDFARB, 
THE CONTEMPT POWER 30–31 (1963). 
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If the full chamber adopts a resolution ordering confinement of the 
witness, the witness may be confined in a congressional cell pending 
compliance with the subpoena.64  Because this power is a form of civil 
contempt, the witness must be released once he complies with the 
subpoena.65  The witness has a right to at least some form of hearing 
before the legislature before contempt sanctions are imposed,66 and 
he may assert any defenses to the subpoena, including privilege and a 
lack of congressional authority, either before the committee or the 
full chamber, or in a habeas corpus proceeding in court.67  Neither 
House has utilized this inherent contempt power since 1932.68 
Four important Supreme Court decisions defined the extent of 
Congress’s inherent contempt power.  The Supreme Court first rec-
ognized Congress’s inherent contempt power in the 1821 case of An-
derson v. Dunn,69 which involved an action for trespassing against the 
House Sergeant-at-Arms for assault and battery and false imprison-
ment brought by a contumacious witness.70  The Supreme Court sus-
tained the dismissal of the case against the Sergeant-at-Arms on the 
ground that the House had inherent authority to punish contempt in 
order to protect its ability to carry out its constitutional responsibili-
ties.71  A contrary conclusion, the Court stated, 
leads to the total annihilation of the power of the House of Representa-
tives to guard itself from contempts, and leaves it exposed to every indig-
nity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may 
mediate against it.  This result is fraught with too much absurdity not to 
bring into doubt the soundness of any argument from which it is derived.  
That a deliberate assembly, clothed with the majesty of the people, and 
 
 64 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 163 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter 
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY GUIDE]. 
 65 See Marshall, 243 U.S. at 544 (“Thus we have been able to discover no single instance 
where in the exertion of the power to compel testimony restraint was ever made to ex-
tend beyond the time when the witness should signify his willingness to testify . . . .”). 
 66 See Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 507 (1972) (holding that the Wisconsin Assembly vi-
olated a contemnor’s due process rights when it denied him notice or chance to re-
spond). 
 67 See BECK, supra note 63, at 6–9 (describing the procedure for prosecuting an individual 
for contempt); GOLDFARB, supra note 63, at 62–64 (discussing the nature of contempt 
proceedings). 
 68 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY GUIDE, supra note 64, at 163. 
 69 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204 (1821); see also GOLDFARB, supra note 63, at 30–33 (examining the 
Anderson case to “illustrate the political misgivings toward application of the English con-
tempt rule to Congress”); Allen B. Moreland, Congressional Investigations and Private Per-
sons, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 189, 194–97 (1967) (suggesting that the importance of Anderson 
was that the Supreme Court “tended to regard the Houses of Congress in the adjudica-
tion of contempts as performing a function analogous to that of a court”). 
 70 Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) at 204–08. 
 71 Id. at 204, 225–27. 
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charged with the care of all that is dear to them, composed of the most 
distinguished citizens, selected and drawn together from every corner of 
a great nation, whose deliberations are required by public opinion to be 
conducted under the eye of the public, and whose decisions must be 
clothed with all that sanctity which unlimited confidence in their wisdom 
and purity can inspire, that such an assembly should not possess the 
power to suppress rudeness, or repel insult, is a supposition too wild to 
be suggested.72 
The Court was not particularly careful in its constitutional analysis 
and it cited no constitutional history, case law, or any other prece-
dents to support the conclusion that Congress should have such an 
inherent contempt power.  The Court was unconcerned about the 
potential for congressional abuse of the contempt power and ad-
dressed those concerns by stating only “that respectful deport-
ment . . . will render all apprehension chimerical.”73  The Court li-
mited the contempt power to “the least possible power adequate to 
the end proposed.”74  Moreover, punishment for contempt must be 
limited to the life of the legislative body which “ceases to exist on the 
moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution.  It follows, that 
imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment.”75  This power 
corresponds in many respects to the civil contempt power of a grand 
jury.76 
Thereafter, in Kilbourn v. Thompson,77 the Court held that Con-
gress’s contempt power was reviewable by the courts, and that, be-
cause of the “popular origin” and political nature of Congress, the 
judiciary should “most careful[ly] scrutin[ize]” this assertion of au-
thority.78  Next, the Supreme Court further explained the precise na-
ture of Congress’s inherent contempt power in In re Chapman,79 where 
it rejected a challenge to a contempt of Congress conviction on the 
ground that the prosecution—first under a criminal statute and then 
punishment pursuant to Congress’s inherent contempt power—
created double jeopardy for the same offense and violation of the 
 
 72 Id. at 228–29. 
 73 Id. at 235. 
 74 Id. at 231 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371–72 (1966) (stating that civil contempt 
expires at the conclusion of a grand jury). 
 77 103 U.S. 168 (1880).  For the factual setting from which this case arose, see supra notes 
27–37 and accompanying text.  The Court concluded that the contempt citation was 
invalid because the investigation to which it related exceeded the permissible scope of 
congressional inquiry.  Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 190–92. 
 78 Id. at 192. 
 79 166 U.S. 661 (1897). 
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Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.80  The Court ruled “the con-
tumacious witness is not subjected to jeopardy twice for the same of-
fence, since the same act may be an offence against one jurisdiction 
and also an offence against another.”81  So, because Congress’s inhe-
rent contempt of Congress authority is essentially the equivalent of 
civil contempt, it does not violate the double jeopardy clause to util-
ize that power and later prosecute the contumacious witness for crim-
inal contempt of Congress.82 
In 1917, the Court imposed additional constraints on Congress’s 
inherent contempt power in the case of Marshall v. Gordon.83  In Mar-
shall, the U.S. District Attorney for New York was arrested by the 
House Sergeant-at-Arms after the House found him in contempt of 
Congress because of a “defamatory and insulting letter” that he had 
written concerning the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee 
on a petition for habeas corpus.84  The Court ordered the petitioner 
released.  The Court emphasized that Congress did not possess the 
broad quasi-judicial powers of the House of Commons: 
[T]he possession by Congress of the commingled legislative-judicial au-
thority as to contempts which was exerted in the House of Commons 
would be absolutely destructive of the distinction between legislative, ex-
ecutive and judicial authority which is interwoven in the very fabric of the 
Constitution and would disregard express limitations therein, it must fol-
low that there is no ground whatever for assuming that any implication as 
to such a power may be deduced from any grant of authority made to 
Congress by the Constitution.85 
2. The Criminal Contempt of Congress Statute 
The criminal contempt statute was enacted in 185786 after a con-
gressional investigation of a newspaper reporter, who refused to an-
swer questions posed by a congressional investigating committee.87  
Because committee members believed the inherent contempt process 
too cumbersome to effectively compel a witness to testify, they intro-
duced a bill that eventually became the contempt of Congress statute 
 
 80 Id. at 671. 
 81 Id. at 672. 
 82 Id. (“[An] indictable statutory offence[] may be punished as such, while the offenders 
may likewise be subjected to punishment for the same acts as contempt, the two be-
ing . . . capable of standing together.”). 
 83 243 U.S. 521 (1917). 
 84 Id. at 531–32. 
 85 Id. at 536. 
 86 Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155. 
 87 See EBERLING, supra note 23, at 302–04. 
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authorizing criminal prosecution of a person cited by either House 
for contempt of Congress.88  The contempt statute allows either 
House to refer a contempt citation to the United States attorney for 
presentation to a grand jury.89  In the ensuing prosecution, the wit-
ness may present any defenses to the subpoena, including applicable 
privileges, but if the judge rejects the defenses, the defendant will be 
convicted of the misdemeanor offense for which the maximum pe-
nalty is one year in jail and a fine of not more than $1000.90 
There are a number of differences between Congress’s inherent 
contempt power and a citation for contempt under the criminal con-
tempt of Congress statute.  First, a witness may immediately challenge 
Congress’s use of the inherent contempt power by a petition for ha-
beas corpus,91 and, if the challenge is rejected, the witness may avoid 
 
 88 Id. 
 89 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2006), which state in relevant part as follows: 
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either 
House of Congress to give testimony to give or to produce papers upon any matter 
under inquiry before either House . . . or any committee of either House of Con-
gress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any ques-
tion pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and 
imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve 
months. 
. . . . 
Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned in section 192 of this title fails to 
appear to testify or fails to produce any books, papers, records, or documents, as 
required, or whenever any witness so summoned refuses to answer any question 
pertinent to the subject under inquiry before either House . . . or any committee 
or subcommittee of either House of Congress, and the fact of such failure or fail-
ures is reported to either House while Congress is in session or when Congress is 
not in session, a statement of fact constituting such failure is reported to and filed 
with the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House, it shall be the duty 
of the said President of the Senate or Speaker of the House, as the case may be, to 
certify, and he shall so certify, the statement of facts aforesaid under the seal of the 
Senate or House, as the case may be, to the appropriate United States attorney, 
whose duty shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action. 
  Congress enacted the criminal contempt statute in 1857 after a frustrating attempt to 
question a New York Times correspondent who had refused to answer questions put to him 
by a select committee appointed by the House to investigate charges of bribery against 
certain representatives.  See supra notes 87 and 88 and accompanying text.  As a result of 
the committee’s unavailing efforts to obtain the reporter’s testimony, the committee 
chairman introduced a bill designed “more effectually to enforce the attendance of wit-
nesses on the summons of either House of Congress, and to compel them to discover tes-
timony.”  CONG. GLOBE, 34TH CONG., 3D SESS. 404 (1857). 
 90 2 U.S.C. § 192; see also Goldfarb, supra note 63, at 40–41 (describing procedures “custo-
marily followed when witnesses before congressional committees refuse to answer perti-
nent questions or to produce subpoenaed books or records”). 
 91 See, e.g., Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 548 (1917) (holding that “the court below 
erred in refusing to grant the writ of habeas corpus”); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 
168, 177 (1880) (noting that Kilbourn’s writ of habeas corpus was granted and he was re-
leased from the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms). 
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any penalty by offering testimony or producing the documents.92  
Criminal contempt, however, may not be purged by agreeing to testi-
fy or produce documents; once a witness refuses to respond to a law-
ful subpoena, the witness has committed a crime and is subject to 
criminal sanctions.93  This difference is especially important in the 
context of congressional investigations because witnesses may not 
bring a judicial challenge to a subpoena prior to enforcement in the 
contempt process.94  As a result, to challenge a congressional subpoe-
na, a witness must place himself at risk of criminal contempt charges 
that may not be purged by subsequent compliance with a subpoena. 
3. Enforcement of a Congressional Subpoena Through a Civil Judicial 
Proceeding 
In 1978, Congress enacted a statute that gave the Senate, but not 
the House, the authority to file a civil action to enforce a subpoena 
for documents or testimony.95  Typically, the Senate Legal Counsel 
brings the lawsuit on behalf of the Senate or a committee or sub-
committee.96  The statute authorizes a federal district court to order 
 
 92 See Marshall, 243 U.S. at 544 (finding “no single instance where in the exertion of the 
power to compel testimony restraint was ever made to extend beyond the time when the 
witness should signify his willingness to testify”). 
 93 See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 154 F. Supp. 126, 136 (D.D.C. 1957) (“[W]hile purga-
tion by compliance relieves from a ‘civil’ contempt, it is no longer a defense to a ‘crimi-
nal’ contempt charge.”), rev’d on other grounds, 255 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (holding 
that the subject matter investigated by the committee’s jurisdiction); see also United States 
v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1952) (“Certainly the refusal to testify was an act in 
contempt of the Committee for which the defendant was subject to the punishment pre-
scribed by the statute.”). 
 94 See, e.g., Sanders v. McClellan, 463 F.2d 894, 902–03 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (considering the 
right of Congress to make inquiries of the plaintiff as greater than the potential chill ef-
fect of the subpoena, thus not warranting injunctive relief); Ansara v. Eastland, 442 F.2d 
751, 753–54 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (denying plaintiff’s claim for emergency injunctive relief, in 
which he sought to have subpoenas voided). 
 95 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 703, 705, 92 Stat. 1824, 1877–80 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b, 288d, and 28 U.S.C. § 1365).  The conference 
report on this bill indicates that the civil enforcement mechanism was limited to the Se-
nate because the relevant House committees had not yet had an opportunity to consider 
whether such authority should be granted to the House.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-1756, at 80 
(1978) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., 4381, 4396. 
 96 ROSENBERG & TATELMAN, supra note 61, at 34 n.206 (“A resolution directing the Senate 
Legal Counsel to bring an action to enforce a committee or subcommittee subpoena 
must be reported by a majority of the members voting, a majority being present, of the 
full committee.  The report filed by the committee must contain a statement of (a) the 
procedure employed in issuing the subpoena; (b) any privileges or objections raised by 
the recipient of the subpoena; (c) the extent to which the party has already complied 
with the subpoena; and (d) the comparative effectiveness of the criminal and civil statu-
tory contempt procedures and a trial at the bar of the Senate.”). 
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compliance with the Senate subpoena, and, if an individual fails to 
comply with the court order, the court may find the individual in 
contempt of court, with both civil and criminal sanctions that are typ-
ically available for contempt of court.97  Since the enactment of the 
statutory provision, the Senate has sought civil enforcement of a sub-
poena for documents or testimony at least six times.98  The judicial 
enforcement mechanism has the benefit of allowing a court to re-
solve any legal issues concerning Congress’s power to obtain testimo-
ny and documents, including a witness’s argument based on the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, lack of compliance with congressional 
procedures, or an inability to comply with the subpoena.99  The sta-
tute contains an express provision stating that it does not authorize 
civil enforcement of a subpoena directed to an officer or employee of 
the Federal Government acting within his official capacity, but the 
Senate report on the provision also disclaimed any intent to restrict 
such an action if authorized by other sources of authority.100  The Se-
nate report states: 
This jurisdictional statute applies to a subpena [sic] directed to any natu-
ral person or entity acting under color of state or local authority.  By the 
specific terms of the jurisdictional statute, it does not apply to a subpoena 
directed to an officer or employee of the Federal Government acting 
within his official capacity.  In the last Congress there was pending in the 
Committee on Government Operations legislation directly addressing 
the problems associated with obtaining information from the Executive 
Branch.  This exception in the statute is not intended to be a Congres-
sional finding that the federal courts do not now have the authority to 
hear a civil action to enforce a subpoena against an officer or an em-
ployee of the Federal Government.  However, if the federal courts do not 
now have this authority, this statute does not confer it.101 
Even without the authority conferred by the Senate statute, both 
Houses can pursue civil enforcement of a subpoena when authorized 
by congressional resolution.102  For example, the House has passed 
 
 97 28 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a)–(b) (2006); see also S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 41 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4257. 
 98 ROSENBERG & TATELMAN, supra 61, at 36. 
 99 Id.; see S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 88–89, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4309. 
100 28 U.S.C. § 1365(a). 
101 S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 91–92, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4307–08 (citation omitted). 
102 Indeed, the Senate has a standing order, which was adopted in 1928, that authorizes a 
committee to seek a court order to enforce its subpoenas.  The resolution states: 
Resolved, That hereafter any committee of the Senate is hereby authorized to 
bring suit on behalf of and in the name of the United States in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction if the committee is of the opinion that the suit is necessary to 
the adequate performance of the powers vested in it or the duties imposed upon it 
by the Constitution, resolution of the Senate, or other law.  Such suit may be 
brought and prosecuted to final determination irrespective of whether or not the 
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resolutions granting at least five special or select committees subpoe-
na authority and the ability to seek judicial enforcement of the sub-
poenas.103  These inquiries include the October surprise (Iranian hos-
tage) investigation,104 the White House travel office inquiry,105 the 
House campaign finance investigation,106 the Select Committee on 
National Security Concerns inquiry into arms sales to China,107 and 
the Teamsters election investigation.108  In any action brought pur-
suant to this authority, a federal court should have jurisdiction under 
the general federal question statute.109  Although a Nixon-era case re-
jected jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the ground for its decision 
was the failure of the lawsuit to meet the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement then contained in the federal question statute.110 
The deletion of the amount-in-controversy requirement from the 
federal question statute should have eliminated any bar to federal 
question jurisdiction over congressional suits to enforce subpoenas.111  
This conclusion is confirmed by the recent suit brought by the House 
of Representatives to enforce its subpoenas against Joshua Bolten and 
Harriet Miers, in which jurisdiction rested upon a resolution adopted 
by the House of Representatives, and federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion was authorized by the general federal question statute.112  There 
 
Senate is in session at the time the suit is brought or thereafter.  The committee 
may be represented in the suit either by such attorneys as it may designate or by 
such officers of the Department of Justice as the Attorney General may designate 
upon the request of the committee.  No expenditures shall be made in connection 
with any such suit in excess of the amount of funds available to the said commit-
tee.  As used in this resolution, the term “committee” means any standing or spe-
cial committee of the Senate, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, or the 
Senate members of any joint committee. 
  STANDING ORDERS OF THE SENATE 161 (2008).  The Committee Research Service has 
opined that this “Standing Order appears to have never been invoked and, therefore, its 
validity remains an open question.”  ROSENBERG & TATELMAN, supra note 61, at 35 n.212. 
103 ROSENBERG & TATELMAN, supra note 61, at 38. 
104 See H.R. Res. 258, 102d Cong. (1992). 
105 See H.R. Res. 369, 104th Cong. (1996). 
106 See H.R. Res. 167, 105th Cong. (1997). 
107 See H.R. Res. 463, 105th Cong. (1998). 
108 See H.R. Res. 507, 105th Cong. (1998). 
109 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); ROSENBERG & TATELMAN, supra note 61, at 42. 
110 See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 
59–61 (D.D.C. 1973) (finding that the $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement of the 
federal question jurisdiction statute was not met). 
111 See Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of Congress, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 620 n.323 (1991) (noting that the amount-in-countroversy require-
ment, which “effectively barred Congress’s enforcement of its Watergate subpoenas,” is 
no longer there). 
112 See Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 64–65 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding 
that “the monetary threshold . . . no longer exists and there is no other impediment to 
invoking § 1331 subject matter jurisdiction here”). 
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remain significant questions, however, whether a federal court should 
entertain a congressional lawsuit to enforce a subpoena against an 
executive official who has asserted the President’s claim of executive 
privilege or dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that resolution of the 
dispute is better left to the political process.113 
B. The President’s Right to Claim Executive Privilege 
Just as with Congress’s assertion of its implied authority to investi-
gate and compel production of documents and testimony, Presidents 
have asserted the right to protect the confidentiality of certain execu-
tive branch documents since the end of the eighteenth century.114  Al-
though the scope and extent of this privilege has been, and continues 
to be, the subject of extensive debate, the Supreme Court expressly 
recognized a constitutionally based right of the President to protect 
the confidentiality of certain kinds of executive branch documents in 
United States v. Nixon.115  In Nixon, the Court enforced a subpoena is-
sued by the Watergate special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, for tapes of 
conversations between President Nixon and his advisors in the Oval 
Office, but, in so doing, the Court stated that the President’s claim of 
privilege warrants an initial presumption of validity and that a privi-
lege to preserve the confidentiality of executive branch documents is 
 
113 See discussion infra Parts IV–V. 
114 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:  A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974); MARK J. 
ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:  THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY (1994) [hereinafter ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:  THE DILEMMA OF 
SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY]; Raoul Berger, Congressional Subpoenas to Ex-
ecutive Officials, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 865 (1975); Jeffrey L. Bleich & Eric B. Wolff, Executive 
Privilege and Immunity:  The Questionable Role of the Independent Counsel and the Courts, 14 ST. 
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 15 (1999); Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 
1383 (1974); Norman Dorsen & John H. F. Shattuck, Executive Privilege, the Congress and the 
Courts, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1974); Rex E. Lee, Executive Privilege, Congressional Subpoena 
Power, and Judicial Review:  Three Branches, Three Powers, and Some Relationships, 1978 BYU L. 
REV. 231 (1978); Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests:  Suffocating the Constitutional Pre-
rogative of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L REV. 631 (1997); Bernard Schwartz, Executive Privi-
lege and Congressional Investigatory Power, 47 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1959); Peter M. Shane, Legal 
Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws:  The Case of Executive Privilege Claims 
Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1987); Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge:  
Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 
(1992); Abraham D. Sofaer, Executive Power and the Control of Information:  Practice Under the 
Framers, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1 (1977); Symposium, Executive Privilege and the Clinton Presidency, 
8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 535 (2000); Symposium, United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. 
REV. 1 (1974); Symposium, United States v. Nixon:  The Prelude, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1061 
(1999); Irving Younger, Congressional Investigations and Executive Secrecy:  A Study in the Sepa-
ration of Powers, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 755 (1959); Joel D. Bush, Note, Congressional-Executive 
Access Disputes:  Legal Standards and Political Settlements, 9 J.L. & POL. 719 (1993). 
115 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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“fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably 
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”116  The 
documents subject to such a presidential claim of privilege relate to 
several different categories of executive branch information. 
First, the courts have been most deferential to the President’s 
need to maintain the confidentiality of documents related to state se-
crets and national security.  The Nixon Court acknowledged in dic-
tum the “need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national 
security secrets.”117  The Court described the scope and history of the 
protection afforded this class of documents as follows: 
As to these areas of Art[icle] II duties the courts have traditionally shown 
the utmost deference to presidential responsibilities.  In C. & S. Air Lines 
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., . . . dealing with Presidential authority involving 
foreign policy considerations, the Court said: 
“The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s or-
gan for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose re-
ports are not and ought not to be published to the world.  It would be 
intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should re-
view and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on informa-
tion properly held secret.” 
In United States v. Reynolds, dealing with a claimant’s demand for evi-
dence in a Tort Claims Act case against the Government, the Court said: 
“It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of 
the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the 
evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national 
security, should not be divulged.  When this is the case, the occasion 
for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize 
the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon 
an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in cham-
bers.” 
No case of the Court, however, has extended this high degree of de-
ference to a President’s generalized interest in confidentiality.  Nowhere 
in the Constitution, as we have noted earlier, is there any explicit refer-
ence to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest relates 
to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is constitutionally 
based.118 
Similarly, in another case, the Supreme Court commented that the 
President’s “authority to classify and control access to information 
bearing on national security . . . flows primarily from . . . [the Com-
mander-in-Chief clause] and exists quite apart from any explicit con-
gressional grant.”119 
 
116 Id. at 708. 
117 Id. at 706. 
118 Id. at 710–11 (citations omitted). 
119 Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). 
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In Nixon, the Court also recognized the existence of a constitu-
tionally based privilege over documents containing deliberative 
communications between the President and his advisors.  The Court 
identified the basis for this privilege as 
the valid need for protection of communications between high Govern-
ment officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance 
of their manifold duties; the importance of this confidentiality is too 
plain to require further discussion.  Human experience teaches that 
those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper 
candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the 
detriment of the decisionmaking process.120 
According to the Court in Nixon, the need to maintain confiden-
tiality over certain kinds of documents dates back to the founding of 
the Republic: 
There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality.  The meet-
ings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were conducted in com-
plete privacy.  Moreover, all records of those meetings were sealed for 
more than 30 years after the Convention.  Most of the Framers acknowl-
edge that without secrecy no Constitution of the kind that was developed 
could have been written.121 
The Court then went on to explain that the right to preserve the con-
fidentiality of executive branch documents was implied by the lan-
guage and structure of the Constitution: 
Whatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential 
communications in the exercise of Art[icle] II powers, the privilege can 
be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own as-
signed area of constitutional duties.  Certain powers and privileges flow 
from the nature of enumerated powers; the protection of the confiden-
tiality of Presidential communications has similar constitutional under-
pinnings.122 
In a later case involving access to information from President 
Clinton’s Health Care Task Force, the D.C. Circuit elaborated on this 
rationale for confidentiality by explaining that the Framers vested the 
executive power in one person “for the very reason that he might 
maintain secrecy in the executive operations.”123  Secrecy enables a 
President to “deliberate in confidence,” and “to decide and to act 
quickly—a quality lacking in the government established by the Ar-
ticles of Confederation.”124 
 
120 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705. 
121 Id. at 705 n.15 (citations omitted). 
122 Id. at 705–06 (footnote omitted). 
123 Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
124 Id. 
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Additionally, although not discussed in Nixon, the executive 
branch has claimed the right to protect the confidentiality of open 
investigative files.125  Attorney General Robert H. Jackson set forth the 
most thorough explanation of the basis for this privilege in an opi-
nion written in 1941.126  Jackson refused a request from the House 
Committee on Naval Affairs for FBI and DOJ papers regarding the 
latter’s investigations of “labor disturbances” among naval contrac-
tors.127  As grounds for his refusal to disclose the documents, Attorney 
General Jackson identified a number of policy rationales.  First, he 
stated: 
Disclosure of the reports could not do otherwise than seriously prejudice 
law enforcement.  Counsel for a defendant or prospective defendant, 
could have no greater help than to know how much or how little infor-
mation the Government has, and what witnesses or sources of informa-
tion it can rely upon.  This is exactly what these reports are intended to 
contain.128 
Second, Attorney General Jackson stated that disclosure of informa-
tion from open investigative files could compromise confidential in-
formants, embarrassing them “sometimes in their employment, 
sometimes in their social relations, and in extreme cases might even 
endanger their lives,” and that the DOJ “regard[ed] the keeping of 
faith with confidential informants as an indispensable condition of 
future efficiency.”129 
Finally, Attorney General Jackson maintained that the production 
of open criminal investigative files could damage the reputations of 
individuals discussed in the files: 
Disclosure of information contained in the reports might also be the 
grossest kind of injustice to innocent individuals.  Investigative reports 
include leads and suspicions, and sometimes even the statements of mali-
cious or misinformed people.  Even though later and more complete re-
ports exonerate the individuals, the use of particular or selected reports 
might constitute the grossest injustice, and we all know that a correction 
never catches up with an accusation.130 
A later memorandum from the department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (“OLC”) identified an additional reason for withholding in-
formation from open investigative files:  the potential for congres-
sional interference and influence over who should be prosecuted for 
 
125 See FISHER, supra note 24; Peterson, supra note 111, at 1379–85. 
126 See 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 45 (1941). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 46. 
129 Id. at 46–47. 
130 Id. at 47. 
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violations of the criminal law.  “[T]he executive cannot effectively in-
vestigate if Congress is, in a sense, a partner in the investigation.  If a 
congressional committee is fully apprised of all details of an investiga-
tion as the investigation proceeds, there is a substantial danger that 
congressional pressures will influence the course of the investiga-
tion.”131 
The OLC reaffirmed this conclusion in a 1986 opinion for the At-
torney General concerning congressional demands for information 
from investigations and pursuant to the Independent Counsel Act.132  
Although acknowledging that Congress has 
a legitimate legislative interest in overseeing the Department’s enforce-
ment of the Independent Counsel Act and relevant criminal sta-
tutes . . . [,] Congress could not justify an investigation based on its disa-
greement with the prosecutorial decision regarding appointment of an 
independent counsel for a particular individual.  Congress simply cannot 
constitutionally second-guess that decision.133 
As a result, “the policy of the Executive Branch throughout our Na-
tion’s history has generally been to decline to provide committees of 
Congress with access to, or copies of, open law enforcement files ex-
cept in extraordinary circumstances.”134 
The courts have not, with perhaps the one exception of military 
and diplomatic secrets,135 treated claims of executive privilege as abso-
lute.  The courts have recognized that the President’s interests in pre-
serving the confidentiality of documents may conflict with the inter-
ests of the judicial branch in obtaining information necessary to a 
criminal or civil case or the interest of Congress in obtaining infor-
mation necessary to a congressional investigation.  In such cases, the 
courts have agreed to adjudicate disputes, and they have generally 
used a balancing test to determine which branch’s interest is more 
powerful in the particular case.  For example, in Nixon, the Court ac-
knowledged that, although the President’s need to freely explore al-
ternatives in pre-decisional deliberations justified “a presumptive pri-
vilege for Presidential communications,” the privilege had to yield in 
 
131 Memorandum from Thomas E. Kauper, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Edward L. Morgan, Deputy Counsel to the President, 2 (Dec. 19, 1969), cited 
in Cong. Subpoenas of Dep’t of Justice Investigative Files, 8 Op. O.L.C. 252, 263 (1984). 
132 Response to Cong. Requests for Info. Re. Decisions Made Under the Indep. Counsel Act, 
10 Op. O.L.C. 68, 68 (1986). 
133 Id. at 74. 
134 Id. at 76. 
135 In United States v. Nixon, the Court indicated that information relating to “military or dip-
lomatic secrets” might be absolutely privileged.  418 U.S. 683, 710–11 (1974). 
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that case to the “demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pend-
ing criminal trial.”136 
The Supreme Court used a similar balancing approach in Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services,137 in which the Court addressed a con-
stitutional challenge to the statute that transferred authority over 
President Richard Nixon’s presidential records to the National Arc-
hives for review and possible disclosure to the public.138  President 
Nixon argued that executive privilege prevented Congress from 
mandating the disclosure of these records, while Congress argued 
that it had a valid legislative interest in providing for retention and 
possible disclosure of the documents.139  As a matter of separation of 
powers methodology, the Supreme Court determined that in decid-
ing whether the statute 
disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the prop-
er inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive 
Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.  Only 
where the potential for disruption is present must we then determine 
whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objec-
tives within the constitutional authority of Congress.140 
In later cases, the D.C. Circuit took up the balancing test utilized 
in Nixon in order to resolve information disputes between the execu-
tive branch and the courts, and the executive branch and Congress.  
One example of the former involved an executive privilege claim in 
response to an independent counsel’s subpoena for documents in 
connection with the investigation of Secretary of Agriculture Michael 
Espy.141  In that case, the court evaluated the executive’s need for con-
fidentiality by distinguishing between a general deliberative process 
privilege that applied throughout the executive branch and a nar-
rower presidential communications privilege that applied to the Pres-
ident and his close advisors; the court required a more compelling 
 
136 Id. at 708, 713. 
137 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
138 Id. at 429. 
139 Id. at 430–33. 
140 Id. at 443 (citation omitted).  The Supreme Court has utilized a similar balancing ap-
proach in determining whether the President and his subordinates had immunity from 
civil lawsuits for damages.  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806–19 (1982) (holding 
that White House advisors have qualified immunity from civil suits for damages in con-
nection with the performance of their official duties); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 
744–57 (1982) (holding that the President is absolutely immune from similar civil ac-
tions). 
141 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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showing of need to overcome the latter privilege.142  The court ruled 
that the judicial branch could prevail over the confidentiality of pres-
idential communications only if the party seeking documents could 
prove “first, that each discrete group of the subpoenaed materials 
likely contains important evidence; and second, that this evidence is 
not available with due diligence elsewhere.”143  The court added that 
“the factors of importance and unavailability are also used by courts 
in determining whether a sufficient showing of need has been dem-
onstrated to overcome other qualified executive privileges, such as 
the deliberative process privilege or the law-enforcement investigato-
ry privilege.”144  The D.C. Circuit utilized a similar balancing ap-
proach in assessing an executive privilege claim in response to a sub-
poena from independent counsel Kenneth Starr in connection with 
the Monica Lewinsky investigation.145 
The courts have usually been reluctant to adjudicate information 
conflicts between the executive branch and Congress.  In Nixon, the 
Court explicitly noted that it expressed no view on whether and when 
an executive privilege claim could prevail against a congressional 
subpoena.146  The lower courts have dealt with congressional-
executive privilege disputes on only four occasions, and have reached 
the merits in only two of those cases.  In Senate Select Committee on Pres-
idential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,147 the D.C. Circuit entertained a 
lawsuit brought by the Senate committee investigating the Watergate 
break-in and related matters to enforce its subpoena to President 
Nixon for tape recordings of certain conversations between the Pres-
ident and the White House Counsel, John Dean.148  The district court 
had sided with the President after “weighing . . . the public interest 
protected by the President’s claim of privilege against the public in-
terests that would be served by disclosure to the Committee in this 
particular instance.”149 
 
142 See id. at 736–40, 745–46 (finding that the presidential communications privilege is “more 
difficult to surmount,” since a party seeking to overcome it must “always provide a fo-
cused demonstration of need”). 
143 Id. at 754. 
144 Id. at 755. 
145 In re Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d 1263, 1266–67 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
146 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 n.19 (1974) (stating that the Court was not 
“concerned with the balance between the President’s” confidendiality interest and con-
gressional demands for information). 
147 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
148 Id. at 726. 
149 Id. at 728 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
102 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
The court of appeals recognized that each branch had a signifi-
cant constitutional interest at stake in the litigation, and it used a ba-
lancing test similar to the one it had used to resolve the dispute be-
tween the special prosecutor and the President over access to 
recordings in the Oval Office.150  The court first addressed the issue of 
the proper methodology for resolving a particular dispute between 
the President and Congress over congressional access to confidential 
executive branch documents.  The court stated: 
So long as the presumption that the public interest favors confidentiality 
can be defeated only by a strong showing of need by another institution 
of Government—a showing that the responsibilities of the institution 
cannot responsibly be fulfilled without access to records of the Presi-
dent’s deliberations—we believed in Nixon v. Sirica, and continue to be-
lieve, that the effective functioning of the presidential office will not be 
impaired.151 
In applying this balancing approach, the court concluded that, be-
cause the House Judiciary Committee was already in possession of the 
tapes, the Senate committee’s “need for the subpoenaed tapes is, 
from a congressional perspective, merely cumulative.”152  Therefore, 
the court stated that: 
The sufficiency of the Committee’s showing of need has come to depend, 
therefore, entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to 
the performance of its legislative functions.  There is a clear difference 
between Congress’s legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury, 
or any institution engaged in like functions.  While fact-finding by a legis-
lative committee is undeniably a part of its tasks, legislative judgments 
normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed legis-
lative actions and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruc-
tion of past events . . . .153 
In this particular case, the court ruled that, given the fact that the 
tapes were already in possession of the House committee, the Senate 
committee’s need for the tapes was less weighty than the President’s 
interest in preserving them from disclosure.154 
In United States v. AT&T Co.,155 the DOJ brought a lawsuit to enjoin 
AT&T from complying with a House subcommittee subpoena that 
demanded AT&T produce DOJ letters that requested the company’s 
 
150 Id. at 729–31; see also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 716–18 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (asserting that 
application of executive privilege depends on the “weighing of the public interest pro-
tected by the privilege against the public interests that would be served by discosure in 
that particular case”). 
151 Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 730. 
152 Id. at 732. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 732–33. 
155 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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assistance in implementing certain national security wiretaps.156  After 
the subcommittee first issued its subpoenas, the DOJ had objected to 
the investigative demand, and it began to negotiate a compromise 
that would allow the subcommittee to obtain necessary information 
without compromising national security.157  The DOJ brought the law-
suit after negotiations with the subcommittee collapsed, and the sub-
committee chairman intervened as a defendant in the case.158  The 
D.C. Circuit initially declined to resolve the dispute and requested 
the parties return to the negotiating table.159  After the negotiations 
between the DOJ and the subcommittee again collapsed, the court, 
while not definitively rejecting the possibility that it would resolve the 
dispute itself, once again directed the parties to return to the nego-
tiating table because a negotiated settlement was preferable to a judi-
cially imposed decision: 
Given our perception that it was a deliberate feature of the constitutional 
scheme to leave the allocation of powers unclear in certain situations, the 
resolution of conflict between the coordinate branches in these situations 
must be regarded as an opportunity for a constructive modus vivendi, 
which positively promotes the functioning of our system.  The Constitu-
tion contemplates such accommodation.  Negotiation between the two 
branches should thus be viewed as a dynamic process affirmatively fur-
thering the constitutional scheme.160 
The court suggested a framework for a possible settlement of the dis-
pute and directed the parties to consider a compromise based upon 
this framework.161  Ultimately the parties worked out a compromise 
and jointly requested the court to dismiss the lawsuit.162 
In 1983, the D.C. District Court dismissed a lawsuit brought by the 
DOJ to challenge a contempt of Congress citation issued to EPA Ad-
ministrator Anne Gorsuch.163  The EPA Administrator had refused to 
comply with a House subcommittee subpoena for documents in con-
nection with the subcommittee’s investigation of the EPA’s enforce-
ment of the Superfund statute.164  As discussed in greater detail be-
 
156 Id. at 122–23. 
157 Id. at 123–24. 
158 Id. at 124. 
159 Id.; see also United States v. AT&T Co., 551 F.2d 384, 395 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (describing 
a possible settlement agreement among the parties). 
160 AT&T Co., 567 F.2d at 130 (footnote omitted). 
161 Id. at 131–33. 
162 See ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:  THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 114, at 95–96. 
163 United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983). 
164 Id. at 151. 
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low,165 this case involved the first contempt of Congress citation issued 
to an official who had asserted the President’s claim of executive pri-
vilege.166  Notwithstanding the unique nature of the constitutional 
confrontation between the branches, the district court followed earli-
er D.C. Circuit opinions refusing to adjudicate pre-enforcement chal-
lenges to congressional subpoenas on the ground of equitable discre-
tion, and it declined to resolve the case on the merits.167  Instead, the 
court stated:  “The difficulties apparent in prosecuting Administrator 
Gorsuch for contempt of Congress should encourage the two 
branches to settle their differences without further judicial involve-
ment.”168 
In summary, then, the case law on judicial resolution of disputes 
over other branches’ access to confidential executive branch informa-
tion has established a number of important principles.  First, with re-
spect to judicial access to such confidential information, the Supreme 
Court has recognized a presumptive privilege for documents reflect-
ing a deliberative process in the White House.  More significantly, the 
Court created a methodological approach for resolving the compet-
ing claims between the executive and judicial branches.  The courts 
must weigh the potential impact on the ability of the executive 
branch to perform its constitutional functions if documents are dis-
closed against the impact on the ability of the judiciary to perform its 
functions if the documents are withheld.  The courts have shown lit-
tle reluctance to decide these questions in appropriate cases where 
disputes arise over access to confidential executive branch documents 
for use in judicial proceedings.  In implementing the balancing test, 
the courts have performed a contextually specific analysis of the par-
ticular documents requested and have ordered disclosure where 
there was a demonstrable need for the documents in a judicial pro-
ceeding that could not be met through some alternative methods. 
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed disputes 
between the executive branch and Congress, the D.C. Circuit has 
played a pivotal role in defining the rights of the respective parties 
and the preferable method for resolving such disputes.  First, this 
court has recognized that the President has a right to assert executive 
 
165 See infra discussion accompanying notes 347–51. 
166 See Peterson, supra note 111, at 571–74 (discussing the Gorsuch controversy and its resolu-
tion). 
167 See House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 152 (citing, inter alia, Sanders v. McClellan, 463 
F.2d 894, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and Ansara v. Eastland, 442 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 
1971)). 
168 House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 153. 
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privilege in response to a congressional request for documents or tes-
timony and has rejected claims that Congress has a unilateral right to 
obtain any documents that it believes are necessary to the perfor-
mance of its legislative functions.  Second, the D.C. Circuit has uti-
lized a methodology similar to the resolution of the judicial-executive 
disputes over access to information, in which the court balances the 
need of the executive branch to maintain the confidentiality of doc-
uments against the need of Congress to obtain the information.  
Third, the court has been reluctant to intervene in such disputes to 
strike the balance itself and has instead left the resolution of such 
disputes to the political process.  As explained in more detail below, 
the process of negotiation and accommodation that typically occurs 
when Congress demands access to confidential executive branch in-
formation does a far better job of balancing the interests of the re-
spective branches than could a court in the context of a judicial pro-
ceeding. 
C. How the Negotiation-Accommodation Process Resolves Congressional 
Demands for Confidential Executive Branch Information 
Congress routinely obtains massive amounts of information from 
the executive branch on a daily basis.  Most of these exchanges occur 
without controversy based upon either a statutory command for the 
production of information or in response to informal requests from 
congressional staffers for information from a particular executive 
branch agency.  In the latter case, when congressional staffers infor-
mally request information from an agency, the agency has a strong 
incentive to respond positively in a way that satisfies the staffers’ re-
quest.  Because the request typically comes from a committee that has 
either budget or oversight responsibility for the agency, it is in the 
agency’s interest not to alienate the congressional staff with whom 
they work on a regular basis.169  Only if the agency officials responsi-
ble for producing the information believe that disclosure would se-
riously harm the ability of the agency to perform its job (such as by 
disclosing information revealing the pre-decisional deliberative 
process or information from open investigative files) will the agency 
decline to produce the requested information from Congress.170 
If the congressional staffers find their request denied by the ex-
ecutive branch agency, their recourse is to raise the matter with the 
 
169 See Peterson, supra note 111, at 626–27 (describing the process by which congressional 
requests of documents from the executive branch proceed). 
170 Id. at 627. 
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member of Congress for whom they work and have the member write 
directly to the agency requesting disclosure of the withheld informa-
tion.  At this point, Congress’s interest in the information must be 
sufficiently great to warrant the intervention of a member and the 
expenditure of his or her time to obtain the documents.  Once the 
request returns to the agency, the agency has an even greater incen-
tive to comply with the request, since it typically has even more of an 
incentive not to antagonize a member of Congress than it has with re-
spect to the staff.  Therefore, the agency is unlikely to refuse the re-
quest unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so.  At 
that point, if the request remains unfulfilled, the member of Con-
gress must raise the issue with the chair of the committee with inves-
tigative or oversight responsibility over the executive branch agency.  
Once again, unless Congress’s interest is particularly compelling, it 
will not be worth the time and effort to pursue the information from 
the executive branch agency.  If, however, the committee chair does 
pursue the matter further, the agency will refuse the request only in 
rare instances because, once again, it will be particularly reluctant to 
antagonize the chair of the committee with oversight responsibility 
for the agency.  At this point it is likely that the matter will be dis-
cussed at the highest levels of the agency in order to determine 
whether the adverse impact on the agency is so significant that the 
agency officials are willing to provoke the ire of the committee chair. 
If the congressional request remains unsatisfied, the committee’s 
next recourse is to obtain a subpoena for production of the docu-
ments.  The authority to issue a subpoena was once delegated from 
the full House to its committees very sparingly because the “power 
appears long to have been deemed too serious a matter for general 
delegation.”171  Typically, Congress delegated the authority to issue 
subpoenas only to specific investigations.172  In the case of the con-
gressional investigation of the Teapot Dome Scandal, for example, 
subpoena authority required the passage of multiple resolutions by 
the full Senate in order to authorize the continuation of the investi-
gation.173  In 1946, however, the Senate granted all of its standing 
committees the authority to issue subpoenas.174  The House did not 
 
171 EBERLING, supra note 23, at 34. 
172 See Marshall, supra note 28, at 804 (noting that Congress “originally exercised its power to 
investigate by passing specific resolutions”). 
173 Id. 
174 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, § 134(a), 60 Stat. 812, 831.  This authority 
was later repealed after the subpoena power was incorporated into the standing rules of 
the Senate.  See Senate Rule XXVI(1), in STANDING ORDERS OF THE SENATE, supra note 
102, at 41 (“Each standing committee, including any subcommittee of any such commit-
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take an analogous action until 1975,175 but the House then quickly au-
thorized subcommittees as well as full committees to issue subpoe-
nas,176 and then authorized committee chairs to issue subpoenas on 
their own authority.177  As one commentator has noted, the delega-
tion of subpoena authority has greatly reduced the burden on com-
mittees seeking the issuance of a subpoena to the executive branch by 
eliminating the need to persuade the full House of the need for an 
investigation which “directly affects the political costs inherent in 
going forward in a number of ways—all to the benefit of the Congress 
and to the detriment of the President.”178  Because the mechanism for 
issuing subpoenas to the executive branch is already in place, “the 
decisions to confront the Executive over particular matters is done in 
the relative shadow of committee meetings—if not by the committee 
chair acting alone.”179 
This process of legislative-executive interaction entails the same 
kind of balancing of needs and interests the courts have described as 
the appropriate way to resolve information disputes.  As the informa-
tion dispute escalates, each branch must determine whether its inter-
ests are sufficiently strong to take the dispute to the next level.  This 
process naturally filters out the vast majority of disputes between the 
branches and accommodates the needs and interests of each.  Only 
when a subpoena is finally issued to the executive branch agency does 
the dispute engender a more ritualized and formal process. 
The procedures for responding to congressional subpoenas have 
been governed by various presidential orders since President Nixon 
issued the first directive on the subject of executive privilege in 
1969.180  President Reagan issued a revised version of this memoran-
dum in 1982, and this memorandum remains the principal directive 
to executive branch agencies concerning responses to congressional 
 
tee, is authorized . . . to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such wit-
nesses and the production of such correspondence, books, papers, and docu-
ments . . . .”). 
175 H.R. Res. 988, 93d Cong. (1974). 
176 H.R. Res. 5, 95th Cong. (1977).  The current grant of power is recorded in House Rule 
XI, cl. 2(m)(1)(B), in JEFFERSON'S MANUAL & RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
563 (2009). 
177 H.R. Res. 5, 95th Cong. § 25 (1977); Marshall, supra note 28, at 805. 
178 Marshall, supra note 28, at 805. 
179 Id. 
180 See Memorandum from Richard Nixon, President of the United States, for the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies on Establishing a Procedure to Govern Compliance 
with Congressional Demands for Information (Mar. 24, 1969), reprinted in H.R. REP. 
NO. 99-435, pt. 2, at 807–08 (1986). 
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subpoenas.181  The Reagan memorandum first discusses the occasion-
al need to withhold documents in order to protect “the confidentiali-
ty of national security secrets, deliberative communications that form 
part of the decision-making process, or other information important 
to the discharge of the Executive Branch’s constitutional responsibili-
ties.”182  According to the memorandum, “[l]egitimate and appropri-
ate claims of privilege should not thoughtlessly be waived,” but it 
states that “good faith negotiations between Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch have minimized the need for invoking executive privi-
lege, and this tradition of accommodation should continue as the 
primary means of resolving conflicts between the Branches.”183 
The Reagan memorandum also sets forth a detailed set of proce-
dures for the assertion of executive privilege in response to a con-
gressional subpoena.  First, it directs agencies to comply with con-
gressional requests for information “as promptly and as fully as 
possible” unless executive officials conclude that the documents may 
be subject to a valid claim of executive privilege.184  The memoran-
dum requires that if the head of an agency or department concludes 
that disclosure raises a substantial issue of executive privilege, he 
must notify and consult with the Assistant Attorney General in charge 
of the OLC and the Counsel to the President.185  The department 
head, the Attorney General, and the Counsel to the President must 
consult with one another and determine whether the subpoenaed 
documents should be released or whether it is possible to reach a 
compromise agreement with Congress in response to the subpoena.186  
If, however, the executive officials determine that they should with-
hold the documents under a claim of executive privilege, they must 
present the issue to the President for a final decision on whether to 
invoke the privilege.187  The memorandum expressly states that “[t]o 
ensure that every reasonable accommodation is made to the needs of 
Congress, the executive privilege shall not be invoked without specif-
ic Presidential authorization.”188 
 
181 See Memorandum from Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, to the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies on Procedures Governing Responses to Congres-
sional Requests for Information (Nov. 4, 1982), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 99-435, pt. 2, at 
1106–08 (1986). 
182 Id. at 1106. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 1107. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 1106. 
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The Reagan memorandum thus allows for the assertion of execu-
tive privilege and the withholding of documents in response to a 
congressional subpoena, but it makes the assertion of the privilege 
difficult indeed.  It requires consultation at the highest levels of the 
executive branch and repeated efforts at compromise with Congress.  
By requiring that the President himself assert the claim of privilege, it 
forces the President to be accountable for the decision to withhold 
documents from Congress and pay the political cost for such a deci-
sion.  As a result, the privilege is not invoked lightly and it remains a 
rather rare occurrence. 
During the Clinton Administration, White House Counsel Lloyd 
N. Cutler issued a memorandum to the heads of agencies supple-
menting the earlier Reagan memorandum on executive privilege.189  
The Cutler memorandum continues to describe the need to “pro-
tect[] the confidentiality of deliberations within the White House, in-
cluding its policy councils, as well as communications between the 
White House and executive departments and agencies.”190  It coun-
sels, however, that “[i]n circumstances involving communications re-
lating to investigations of personal wrongdoing by government offi-
cials, it is our practice not to assert executive privilege, either, in 
judicial proceedings or in congressional investigations and hear-
ings.”191  The Cutler memorandum also instructs agencies to treat all 
White House documents in their possession as presumptively privi-
leged and directs that “Executive Privilege belongs to the President, 
not individual departments or agencies.”192  Cutler’s successor as 
White House Counsel, Abner J. Mikva, supplemented the Cutler 
memorandum by clarifying that the earlier memorandum was in-
tended to govern a subset of executive privilege claims in which 
agencies or departments possessed documents concerning intra-
White House decisions or communications between the White House 
and the department or agency.193 
 
189 See Memorandum from Lloyd N. Cutler, Special Counsel to the President, to All Execu-
tive Department and Agency General Counsels on Congressional Requests to Depart-
ments and Agencies for Documents Protected by Executive Privilege (Sept. 28, 1994), re-
printed in. Cong. Research Serv., RL 30240, Congressional Oversight Manual app. C at 
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190 Id. at 127. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 See Memorandum from Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President, to All Executive Branch 
Department and Agency General Counsels on Follow-up Guidance on Responding to 
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If a President asserts a claim of executive privilege, then a number 
of important consequences follow.  These consequences flow from an 
OLC opinion issued in 1984 after the controversy over the contempt 
of Congress citation issued to EPA Administrator Gorsuch.194  This 
opinion (now commonly known as the “Olson Memorandum”) 
reached two important conclusions.  First, Congress could not consti-
tutionally direct the U.S. Attorney to proceed with a prosecution for 
contempt of Congress or even to refer the matter to a grand jury.  
The U.S. Attorney, and by implication, the Attorney General who su-
pervises the U.S. Attorney, must retain discretion to decide whether 
or not to proceed with a criminal prosecution.195  Second, the Olson 
Memorandum concluded that allowing the prosecution of an execu-
tive branch official who asserted the President’s claim of executive 
privilege would inhibit the President’s ability to claim privilege in ap-
propriate cases, and that such prosecutions were constitutionally im-
permissible.196 
Building upon the Olson Memorandum, a later OLC opinion 
(now commonly known as the “Cooper Memorandum”)197 concluded 
that the President’s formal assertion of executive privilege immu-
nized an executive branch official from prosecution for contempt of 
Congress and concluded that U.S. Attorneys should never prosecute 
for contempt of Congress an executive branch official who asserts the 
President’s claim of executive privilege.198  Thus, if the President has 
the political will to assert a formal claim of executive privilege, Con-
gress effectively loses the enforcement sanction of the criminal con-
tempt of Congress statute as a method for inducing compliance with 
a congressional subpoena.  At that point, Congress is left with the op-
tion of using its own inherent contempt power, which the executive 
branch will inevitably resist,199 attempting to force disclosure of the 
documents by increasing the political pressure on the President, or 
filing a civil lawsuit in order to obtain judicial enforcement of the 
subpoena.  Congress chose the latter course when it failed to obtain 
documents and testimony from Joshua Bolten and Harriet Miers. 
The preceding Sections have established a number of points that 
are essential predicates to the following discussion.  First, both Con-
 
194 See 8 Op. O.L.C. 101 (1984) [hereinafter Olson Memorandum]. 
195 Id. at 125. 
196 Id. at 142. 
197 See 10 Op. O.L.C. 68 (1986) [hereinafter Cooper Memorandum]. 
198 Id. at 91–92. 
199 Previously, the Olson Memorandum also had concluded that the use of Congress’s inhe-
rent contempt power against an executive official who asserted the President’s claim of 
privilege would be unconstitutional.  Olson Memorandum, supra note 194, at 142. 
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gress and the President have implied constitutional powers over gov-
ernment information that have been frequently asserted over the past 
220 years and have been recognized by the Supreme Court.  Second, 
neither of these powers is absolute.  Each branch has recognized the 
constitutional authority of the other, and the Supreme Court has 
recognized that neither power is absolute or subject to the unilateral 
control of one branch over the other.  Finally, when these powers 
conflict, the dispute over access to executive branch information is 
typically resolved by a process of negotiation and accommodation be-
tween the branches rather than through resolution in a judicial pro-
ceeding.  In the next Section, we will see how the Bush Administra-
tion attempted to thwart this process through the assertion of 
absolute privilege and how the district court stepped in to reject 
claims of absolute authority and push the parties back to the bargain-
ing table. 
D. The Bolten and Miers Case 
The Bolten/Miers executive privilege dispute arose in the context 
of a congressional investigation of President Bush’s decision to fire a 
number of U.S. Attorneys.200  In January 2006, D. Kyle Sampson, Chief 
of Staff for Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, recommended to 
White House Counsel Harriet Miers that the President proceed with a 
plan to fire a number of U.S. Attorneys based upon a list that Samp-
son had previously sent to the White House.201  Sampson argued that 
a “limited number of U.S. [A]ttorneys could be targeted for removal 
 
200 See ROSENBERG & TATELMAN, supra note 61, at 65–66 (noting that Congress issued and 
served subpoenas on two White House officials as part of its on-going efforts to seek in-
formation relating to the firing of the U.S. Attorneys); John McKay, Train Wreck at the Jus-
tice Department:  An Eye Witness Account, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 265, 265–92 (2008) (discuss-
ing the firing of the U.S. Attorneys and analyzing the issues relating to politically moti-
vated dismissals of prosecutors); Mark J. Rozell & Mitchel A. Sollenberger, Executive 
Privilege and the Bush Administration, 24 J.L. & POL. 1, 32–35 (2008) [hereinafter Rozell & 
Sollenberger, Bush Administration] (explaining the events that led up to the executive pri-
vilege controversy); Mark J. Rozell & Mitchel A. Sollenberger, Executive Privilege and the 
U.S. Attorneys Firings, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 315, 319–24 (2008) (same); David C. 
Weiss, Note, Nothing Improper? Examining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Partisan 
Motivation, and Pretextual Justification in the U.S. Attorney Removals, 107 MICH. L. REV. 317, 
322–27 (2008) (analyzing the U.S. Attorney firings and arguing for statutory reform to 
prevent politically motivated firings of prosecutors). 
201 David Johnston & Eric Lipton, “Loyalty” to Bush and Gonzales Was a Factor in Prosecutors Fir-
ings, Email Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A18.  The Department of Justice requested 
and received resignations from the following U.S. attorneys:  Daniel Bogden (D. Nev.), 
Paul K. Charlton (D. Ariz.), Margaret Chiara (W.D. Mich.), David E. Iglesias (D.N.M.), 
Carole Lam (S.D. Cal.), John McKay (W.D. Wash.), and Kevin Ryan (N.D. Cal.).  Comm. 
on Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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and replacement, mitigating the shock to the system that would result 
from an across the board firing.”202  Sampson added a list of candi-
dates for removal, which was followed a month later by an email from 
Monica Goodling, the Deputy Director of the Executive Office for 
U.S. Attorneys, which attached a spreadsheet listing every U.S. Attor-
ney and including information on political activities and whether the 
U.S. Attorneys were members of the conservative Federalist Society.203  
After further consultations among DOJ officials, including Attorney 
General Gonzales and Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty,204 on 
December 7, 2006, DOJ officials informed seven U.S. Attorneys that 
they were being removed from their positions.205  As the district court 
ruling on the House’s action to enforce its subpoenas later noted, 
[t]he circumstances surrounding these forced resignations aroused al-
most immediate suspicion.  Few of the U.S. Attorneys, for instance, were 
given any explanation for the sudden request for their resignations.  
Many had no reason to suspect that their superiors were dissatisfied with 
their professional performance; to the contrary, most had received favor-
able performance reviews.  Additional revelations further fueled specula-
tion that improper criteria had motivated the dismissals.206 
By mid-January of 2007, Congress began to express concerns 
about the U.S. Attorney firings and the Bush Administration’s plan to 
replace the fired U.S. Attorneys with interim appointments that did 
not require Senate confirmation.207  In a January 18 Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearing, several Senators confronted the Attorney Gener-
al on the U.S. Attorney firings.208  Gonzales acknowledged that the 
DOJ had requested the U.S. Attorneys’ resignations but said that the 
firings were the result of a performance evaluation, and he asserted, 
“I think I would never, ever make a change in United States Attorney 
 
202 Dan Eggen & John Solomon, Firing Had Genesis in White House:  Ex-counsel Miers First Sug-
gested Dismissing Prosecutors Two Years Ago, Documents Show, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/12/AR20070312018
18_pf.html. 
203 David Johnston & Eric Lipton, Email Identified G.O.P. Candidates for Justice Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 14, 2007, at A1. 
204 David Johnston & Eric Lipton, Gonzales Met with Advisers on Dismissals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
2007, at A1. 
205 Johnston & Lipton, supra note 201. 
206 Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 57. 
207 Letter from Senators Patrick Leahy & Dianne Feinstein to Alberto Gonzales, Attorney 
General of the United States (Jan. 9, 2007), cited in Rozell & Sollenberger, Bush Adminis-
tration, supra note 200, at 33 (2008). 
208 See Department of Justice Oversight:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
24 (2007) (statement of Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen.). 
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position for political reasons or if it would in any way jeopardize an 
ongoing serious investigation.  I just would not do it.”209 
After the initial oversight hearing the Senate opened a new hear-
ing specifically on the subject of the U.S. Attorney firings.210  At the 
hearing, Senator Charles Schumer warned, “If we do not get the do-
cumentary information that we seek, I will consider moving to sub-
poena that material, including performance evaluations and other 
documents.”211  DOJ officials, however, were evasive in their responses 
to Senate questioning,212 and Attorney General Gonzales’s later ex-
planation that the firings were “related to policy, priorities and man-
agement”213 did nothing to quell the rising suspicions that the firings 
were politically motivated.  The Attorney General’s Chief of Staff, 
Kyle Sampson, resigned on March 12, 2007, after admitting that the 
department had not entirely disclosed the extent of White House in-
volvement in the firings.214  A week later President Bush admitted that 
the Administration’s explanation of the U.S. Attorney firings was 
“confusing and, in some cases, incomplete.  Neither the Attorney 
General nor I approve of how these explanations were handled.  
We’re determined to correct the problem.”215  President Bush then 
proposed a compromise under which certain White House docu-
ments and emails would be disclosed, but he would not permit White 
House officials to testify concerning the matter.216  After DOJ officials 
gave conflicting accounts of the Attorney General’s involvement in 
the U.S. Attorney firings,217 the House Judiciary Committee served 
Gonzales with the first subpoena for documents relating to the re-
movals.218 
 
209 Dan Eggen, Prosecutor Firings Not Political, Gonzales Says:  Attorney General Acknowledges, De-
fends Actions, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2007, at A2. 
210 See Preserving Prosecutorial Independence:  Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and 
Firing of U.S. Attorneys?:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007). 
211 Id. at 2. 
212 See id. at 13–18 (statement of Paul J. McNulty, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen.) (declining to an-
swer the questions of Senator Arlen Specter directly). 
213 Alberto R. Gonzales, They Lost My Confidence, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2007, at 10A. 
214 Rebecca A. Carr & Ken Herman, Gonzales, Rove Had Early Role in Firings:  Emails Show High 
White House Interest, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 10, 2007 at C1. 
215 Remarks on the Department of Justice and an Exchange with Reporters, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 359 (Mar. 20, 2007). 
216 Id. at 359–61. 
217 See Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Ex-aide Contradicts Gonzales on Firings, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 
2007, at A01 (reporting Sampson’s testimony that Gonzales was more deeply involved in 
the U.S. Attorney firings than he admitted, and that he and his aides sometimes made in-
accurate claims in relation to the firings). 
218 Dan Eggen, House Panel Issues First Subpoena Over Firings, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2007, at 
A01. 
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On June 13, 2007, the House Judiciary Committee issued subpoe-
nas to Harriet Miers ordering her to testify and produce certain doc-
uments and to White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten (ordering 
him to produce documents).219  Acting upon advice from the DOJ, 
the President asserted a claim of executive privilege in response to 
the subpoenas issued to the White House.220  Fred Fielding, Bush’s 
White House Counsel, responded to the subpoenas to Miers and Bol-
ten by advising the chairs of the House and Senate committees that 
“the President has decided to exert Executive Privilege and therefore 
the White House will not be making any production in response to 
these subpoenas for documents.”221  In addition, Mr. Fielding stated 
that the President had directed Miers not to produce documents or 
to testify before the committee.222  Moreover, the White House re-
fused to provide a privilege log identifying which documents were be-
ing withheld under a claim of executive privilege.223 
On July 25, 2007, the House Judiciary Committee voted to cite 
both Miers and Bolten for contempt of Congress.224  Committee 
Chairman John Conyers stated that the purpose of the contempt vote 
was “not only to gain an accurate picture of the facts surrounding the 
U.S. [A]ttorneys controversy, but to protect our constitutional pre-
rogatives as a co-equal branch of government.”225  In response, a Jus-
tice Department official asserted that, pursuant to the existing policy 
at the DOJ, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia would be 
instructed not to refer any contempt citation to the grand jury.226  
Over the next six months, the two sides continued to negotiate, Con-
gress continued to issue subpoenas, and the White House continued 
to assert executive privilege.227 
Finally, on February 15, 2008, the full House voted to cite both Jo-
shua Bolten and Harriet Miers for contempt of Congress.228  Attorney 
General Michael B. Mukasey, recently appointed to replace Gonzales 
who had resigned under fire for the U.S. Attorney scandal, stated that 
 
219 Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 61 (D.D.C. 2008). 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 




227 See Rozell & Sollenberger, Bush Administration, supra note 200, at 39–40 (describing the 
stallmate between Congress and the White House over the inquiry into the U.S. Attorney 
firings). 
228 Philip Shenon, House Votes to Issue Contempt Citations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at A17. 
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“he did not expect that he would act in contravention of longstand-
ing department precedent” against referring contempt citations to a 
grand jury in cases of executive privilege.229  The Attorney General re-
sponded to the contempt citation by stating that “the Department has 
determined that noncompliance . . . with the Judiciary Committee 
subpoenas did not constitute a crime, and therefore the Department 
will not bring the congressional contempt citations before a grand 
jury or take any other actions to prosecute Mr. Bolten or Ms. 
Miers.”230 
After the DOJ declined to prosecute the contempt citations, the 
House Judiciary Committee filed a civil lawsuit against Miers and Bol-
ten to obtain judicial enforcement of the subpoenas pursuant to Res-
olution 980, which authorized the chair of the committee to seek dec-
laratory and injunctive relief “affirming the duty of any individual to 
comply with any subpoena.”231  Miers and Bolten “moved to dismiss 
th[e] action in its entirety on the grounds that the Committee 
lack[ed] standing and a proper cause of action, that disputes of this 
kind are non-justiciable, and that the Court should exercise its discre-
tion to decline jurisdiction.”232  In addition, on the merits of the ac-
tion, Miers and Bolten argued that “sound principles of separation of 
powers and presidential autonomy dictate that the President’s closest 
advisors must be absolutely immune from compelled testimony be-
fore Congress, and that the Committee has no authority to demand a 
privilege log from the White House.”233  The Committee cross-moved 
for partial summary judgment.234  The court’s order denied the de-
fendants’ motion and partially granted plaintiff’s motion by declar-
ing: 
Harriet Miers is not immune from compelled congressional process; she 
is legally required to testify pursuant to a duly issued congressional sub-
poena from plaintiff; and Ms. Miers may invoke executive privilege in re-
sponse to specific questions as appropriate . . . .235 
In addition, the court ordered that “Joshua Bolten and Ms. Miers 
shall produce all non-privileged documents requested by the applica-
ble subpoenas and shall provide to plaintiff a specific description of 
 
229 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
230 Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 63–64 (D.D.C. 2008) (alteration in orig-
inal) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
231 H.R. Res. 980, 110th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2008). 
232 Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 55–56. 
233 Id. at 56. 
234 Id. at 57. 
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any documents withheld from production on the basis of executive 
privilege.”236 
Although the Court ruled in favor of the House Committee, it 
emphasized that the scope of its ruling was quite narrow: 
It is important to note that the decision today is very limited.  To be sure, 
most of this lengthy opinion addresses, and ultimately rejects, the Execu-
tive’s several reasons why the Court should not entertain the Commit-
tee’s lawsuit, but on the merits of the Committee’s present claims the 
Court only resolves, and again rejects, the claim by the Executive to abso-
lute immunity from compelled congressional process for senior presiden-
tial aides.  The specific claims of executive privilege that Ms. Miers and 
Mr. Bolten may assert are not addressed—and the Court expresses no 
view on such claims.  Nor should this decision discourage the process of 
negotiation and accommodation that most often leads to resolution of 
disputes between the political branches.  Although standing ready to ful-
fill the essential judicial role to “say what the law is” on specific assertions 
of executive privilege that may be presented, the Court strongly encou-
rages the political branches to resume their discourse and negotiations in 
an effort to resolve their differences constructively, while recognizing 
each branch’s essential role.237 
In rejecting the various justiciability arguments presented by Miers 
and Bolten, the court reached a number of conclusions relevant to 
the issue of enforcement of congressional subpoenas.  First, the court 
held that the case presented a “type of dispute traditionally capable 
of resolution before an Article III court.”238  The court thought this 
case to be resolvable in an Article III forum because 
(1) in essence, this lawsuit merely seeks enforcement of a subpoena, 
which is a routine and quintessential judicial task; and (2) the Supreme 
Court has held that the judiciary is the final arbiter of executive privilege, 
and the grounds asserted for the Executive’s refusal to comply with the 
subpoena are ultimately rooted in executive privilege.239 
Curiously, Miers and Bolten argued that the issue need not be jus-
ticiable because Congress could rely on its inherent contempt powers 
to imprison witnesses who fail to comply with congressional subpoe-
nas, even though this argument was flatly inconsistent with the con-




237 Id. at 56–57. 
238 Id. at 66. 
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240 See Olson Memorandum, supra note 194, at 142 (concluding that Congress does not have 
the authority to compel prosecution of an executive branch official or even that a particu-
lar case be referred to a grand jury). 
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imprisoning current (and even former) senior presidential advisors and 
prosecuting them before the House would only exacerbate the acrimony 
between the two branches and would present a grave risk of precipitating 
a constitutional crisis.  Indeed, one can easily imagine a stand-off be-
tween the Sergeant-at-Arms and executive branch law enforcement offi-
cials concerning taking Mr. Bolten into custody and detaining him.  Such 
unseemly, provocative clashes should be avoided, and there is no need to 
run the risk of such mischief when a civil action can resolve the same is-
sues in an orderly fashion . . . .  [E]ven if the Committee did exercise in-
herent contempt, the disputed issue would in all likelihood end up be-
fore this Court, just by a different vehicle—a writ of habeas corpus 
brought by Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten.  In either event there would be 
judicial resolution of the underlying issue.241 
Finally, the court rejected the argument that it should decline to rule 
on the case as a matter of its equitable discretion.242 
Miers and Bolten appealed the District Court decision and moved 
for a stay pending appeal and for expedited review.  The D.C. Circuit 
granted the motion for a stay, but it rejected the motion for expe-
dited review on the ground that 
even if expedited, this controversy will not be fully and finally resolved by 
the Judicial Branch—including resolution by a panel and possible re-
hearing by this court en banc and by the Supreme Court—before the 
110th Congress ends on January 3, 2009.  At that time, the 110th House 
of Representatives will cease to exist as a legal entity, and the subpoenas 
it has issued will expire.243 
On March 4, 2009, the House Committee reached an agreement 
with the Obama Administration and attorneys for former President 
George W. Bush to resolve the issues raised by the House Committee 
lawsuit.  White House Counsel Gregory B. Craig held weeks of nego-
tiations in order to “avert a federal court showdown that could have 
restricted the authority of the president in future disputes with other 
branches of government.”244  The agreement provided former presi-
dential advisor Carl Rove and former White House Counsel Miers 
would testify before the House Judiciary Committee in transcribed in-
terviews, under penalty of perjury, but not in the presence of cam-
eras, reporters, or members of the public.245  Furthermore, the White 
House was required to produce documents concerning the U.S. At-
torneys matter between the dates of 2004 and March 2007.246  The 
 
241 Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 92 (citation omitted). 
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tween the other two branches of government). 
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agreement also, however, provided certain protections for particular-
ly sensitive executive privileged material.  Counsel for the witnesses 
were permitted to direct witnesses not to answer questions that re-
lated “to communications to or from the President.”247  In addition, 
“[four] pages of particularly sensitive privileged material (which will 
be described for Committee staff by a representative of the former 
president)” were withheld from the production to the House Com-
mittee.248  In addition, the agreement stated that for documents post-
dating March 8, 2007, only certain documents would be provided.  As 
to these documents, the Committee would be able only to review and 
not copy the documents.249 
Lawmakers were generally happy about the agreement.  House 
Judiciary Committee Chair John Conyers stated, “[w]e have finally 
broken through the Bush administration’s claims of absolute immun-
ity . . . . This is a victory for the separation of powers and congression-
al oversight.”250  House Speaker Nancy Pelosi stated that “when there 
are credible allegations about the politicization of law enforcement, 
the need for congressional oversight is at its greatest.”251  Other com-
mentators suggested that the agreement was a useful compromise for 
both sides.  Neil Eggleston, a former White House lawyer for Presi-
dent Bill Clinton, stated that the agreement was a “good resolu-
tion . . . that gets the House Judiciary Committee and the American 
public the information it needs to complete this investigation but still 
recognizes some interest in the White House protecting truly confi-
dential communications.”252 
Not all, however, were happy with the resolution of the lawsuit.  
One commentator has noted, 
[a]lthough a settlement was eventually reached, the Congress that origi-
nally issued the subpoenas had ended, as had the administration that the 
subpoenas were intended to help Congress oversee.  To the extent that 
enforcement of congressional subpoenas is left to the courts, future ad-
ministrations now know that they can delay compliance for years.253 
Given the at least temporary success of the Bush Administration in 
blocking access to any White House documents or testimony con-
 
247 Agreement Concerning Accommodation, at 1 Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. 
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cerning the U.S. Attorneys matter, it is not surprising that a number 
of articles have called for changes in the method by which executive 
privilege disputes are resolved between Congress and the executive 
branch.  First, some critics argue that Congress should utilize its inhe-
rent contempt of Congress authority to arrest executive branch offi-
cials who refuse to comply with a congressional subpoena because the 
President has asserted a claim of executive privilege.254  Others have 
argued that Congress has the authority to make a final determination 
concerning whether the executive branch should produce docu-
ments in response to a congressional subpoena, including the right 
to make a final determination which must be respected by the courts 
that a President’s claim of executive privilege is meritless.255  Finally, 
others argue that, rather than deferring to the political process, the 
courts should take an active role in adjudicating executive privilege 
disputes in the same manner as they adjudicate any other separation 
of powers issue.256  Each of these arguments will be analyzed below. 
II.  USING CONGRESS’S INHERENT CONTEMPT POWER TO IMPRISON 
OFFICIALS WHO ASSERT THE PRESIDENT’S CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE 
PRIVILEGE IN RESPONSE TO A CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENA 
Those who favor the use of Congress’s inherent contempt power 
to resolve disputes over executive privilege argue that: 
[T]he houses of Congress have the authority to hold executive branch of-
ficials in contempt, and that defiance of a congressional subpoena quali-
fies as contempt.  Most notably . . . each house is  properly understood as 
the final arbiter of disputes arising out of its contempt power—that is, 
when an executive branch official raises executive privilege as a defense 
justifying her defiance of a congressional subpoena, the house of Con-
gress is the proper tribunal to determine whether the invocation of ex-
ecutive privilege was appropriate.  This means that legislative-executive 
disputes over the contempt power should be understood to be nonjusti-
ciable.257 
 
254 See id. at 1152 (discussing the options available to Congress when executive branch offic-
ers refuse to comply with a subpoena); Zuckerman, supra note 18, at 44 (arguing that 
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Another commentator suggests that Congress could utilize its in-
herent contempt power by delegating the contempt power “to a spe-
cialized internal body that would adjudicate contempt citations and 
forward its findings and recommendations to the full chamber for fi-
nal disposition.”258 
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that Congress’s use of 
its inherent contempt power does not seem to be a very practical or 
effective way for Congress to enforce its institutional prerogatives.  
Proponents of this authority suggest that “each house has a sergeant-
at-arms, and the Capitol building has its own jail.  The sergeant can 
be sent to arrest contemnors and, if necessary, hold them in his cus-
tody until either their contempt is purged or the congressional ses-
sion ends.”259  The use of such power in an executive privilege dis-
pute, however, presents the improbable image of the Sergeant-at-
Arms knocking at the White House gate and asking to be admitted so 
he can arrest the President’s chief of staff.  Obviously, if the President 
has ordered his chief of staff to assert executive privilege, he is not 
going to permit a congressional Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest the Chief 
of Staff, and the President has more than enough force to insure that 
no such arrest is made.  This point is significant not just because the 
President can easily foil any attempt to arrest an executive branch 
official, but also because the stand-off suggests why Congress’s unila-
teral assertion of its own authority is inconsistent with the separation 
of powers.  Each branch has a constitutionally based prerogative, and 
each branch has the right to assert its constitutionally based claim 
against the other.  Congress no more has the unilateral right to arrest 
an executive official for asserting the president’s constitutionally 
based claim of executive privilege than the President has the unila-
teral right to send the Secret Service or FBI to arrest a member of 
Congress for issuing a subpoena for constitutionally protected execu-
tive branch information. 
The suggestion that Congress use its contempt power to arrest an 
official who asserts executive privilege is not only impractical, but also 
rests on uncertain grounds.  Commentators have justified Congress’s 
unilateral use of its inherent power against executive privilege on 
several grounds, including English and American history which shows 
that “the houses of Congress have the authority to hold executive 
branch officials in contempt,”260 and that the ability to enforce its 
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subpoena power through inherent contempt of Congress proceed-
ings is necessary to remedy “the Executive’s refusal to prosecute 
[which] may result in unremedied obstruction to the legislative 
process, making a ‘mockery’ of the legislative power.”261  As will be 
shown below, however, there is no relevant history supporting Con-
gress’s unilateral right to arrest an executive branch official for assert-
ing the President’s claim of executive privilege.  Nor is it necessary 
for Congress to assert such a unilateral authority in order to protect 
its own constitutional prerogatives. 
A. The History of Congress’s Contempt Power 
Before discussing the specific historical precedents that are 
claimed to support Congress’s authority to imprison executive branch 
officials who assert the president’s claim of executive privilege, it is 
important first to understand precisely what kind of evidence would 
support such a claim.  It is not enough simply to show that Parlia-
ment, state legislatures, or the Congress have resisted executive 
branch encroachments on their authority.  Obviously, there is a long 
history of conflicts between the legislative and executive power over a 
wide range of subjects, not just access to executive branch documents 
and testimony.  The fact that legislatures have protested against ex-
ecutive branch encroachments and have argued in favor of their con-
stitutional authority does not establish a precedent for the use of 
force and imprisonment against the executive branch in such dis-
putes.  Similarly, the use by Congress of the political weapons at its 
disposal, including refusing to appropriate funds needed by the ex-
ecutive branch, refusing to confirm nominees to executive branch 
positions, or passing legislation that permissibly limits the powers of 
the executive branch, does not establish a precedent for Congress’s 
unilateral use of its power to arrest and imprison executive branch 
officials.  Indeed, the political weapons available to Congress are 
among the many reasons why Congress does not need the authority 
to arrest executive branch officials in order to enforce its legitimate 
constitutional prerogatives.262 
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ecutive branch officials in contempt.”). 
262 See infra Part II.B. 
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Finally, the mere assertion by legislatures of authority to imprison 
executive branch officials for asserting a claim of executive privilege 
would not be enough to establish a significant constitutional 
precedent if the executive branch has resisted such an assertion of 
power and failed to acquiesce in Congress’s assertion of it.  As Eric 
Posner and Adrian Vermeule have cogently argued, such “constitu-
tional showdowns” between the political branches have precedential 
significance with respect to the relative constitutional powers of the 
branches only when a dispute “ends in the total or partial acquies-
cence by one branch in the views of the other . . . .”263  With that in 
mind, we now turn to an analysis of the precedents cited in support 
of Congress’s use of inherent contempt power against officials who 
assert the President’s claim of executive privilege. 
1. English Parliamentary Precedents 
As a preliminary matter, one might doubt the relevance of any 
precedents from English parliamentary practice.  An assertion of au-
thority by the English Parliament against the unelected and politically 
unaccountable authority of the English monarchy would not neces-
sarily be relevant to a dispute between the two politically accountable 
branches of the federal government, each of which has an acknowl-
edged constitutional prerogative.  Moreover, as the Supreme Court 
stated in the context of a case involving the scope of Congress’s inhe-
rent contempt power: 
[T]he possession by Congress of the commingled legislative-judicial au-
thority as to contempts which was exerted in the House of Commons 
would be absolutely destructive of the distinction between legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial authority which is interwoven in the very fabric of 
the Constitution and would disregard express limitations therein, it must 
follow that there is no ground whatever for assuming that any implication 
as to such a power may be deduced from any grant of authority made to 
Congress by the Constitution.264 
Even if one were to accept, however, that parliamentary practice is 
relevant to the issue at hand, there is no precedent for the arrest of 
an executive official for withholding documents that are arguably 
protected by any form of executive privilege.  The first significant ex-
ample cited by Professor Chafetz involved the arrest of George Fer-
rers, a member of Parliament, pursuant to an action in the King’s 
 
263 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 997 
(2008). 
264 Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 536 (1917). 
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Bench to recover a debt.265  The House of Commons sent its sergeant 
to obtain Ferrers’ release, but the jailers resisted the sergeant and 
were aided by the arrival of London’s sheriffs.266  The Parliament later 
arrested the jailers as well as the person who initiated the suit against 
Ferrers and imprisoned them for contempt.267  After the Parliament 
released the prisoners, King Henry VIII commended their action be-
cause Ferrers was the King’s servant as well, which by itself would have 
privileged him against arrest.268  Professor Chafetz argues that “[b]y 
punishing these contempts itself, the House asserted an institutional 
identity independent from the Crown:  contempts were no longer in-
terferences with the functioning of royal governance; rather, they 
were interferences with the House’s ability to do its own business.”269  
Thus, Professor Chafetz argues, “it became conceivable to hold 
Crown officers—indeed, even monarchs themselves—in contempt.”270  
Although this incident marks an interesting chapter in the Parlia-
ment’s struggle to assert an independent identity from the Crown, 
and has some relevance to the history of our own Constitution’s li-
mited protections against the arrest of legislators,271 it hardly amounts 
to a precedent for the unilateral use of force against an official who 
asserts the president’s claim of executive privilege. 
Other examples cited by Professor Chafetz do not involve con-
tempt of Parliament at all but simply Parliament’s resistance to an ef-
fort by the Crown to breach or limit some parliamentary preroga-
tive.272  These clashes between the King and Parliament were certainly 
important to the establishment of Parliament as an independent 
branch of government, but they hardly support the claim that Con-
gress may imprison an official who asserts the President’s claim of 
privilege.  It seems a little far-fetched to claim that “the English Civil 
War can well be thought of as the victory of parliamentary privilege 
over such claims of royal prerogative—indeed, as the ultimate finding 
of contempt of Parliament.”273  The mere fact that Parliament claimed 
 
265 Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1095. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 1096–97. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 1097.  
270 Id. 
271 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and 
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of 
their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any 
Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.”). 
272 Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1099–1100 (discussing conflicts between the Crown and Parlia-
ment under Queen Elizabeth I and King James I). 
273 Id. at 1101. 
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the right to question the King and the King’s officials, and that it re-
sisted the King’s effort to attack its own privileges and powers, offers 
nothing of relevance to the modern day executive privilege dispute.  
These battles between Parliament and the King over issues such as 
the power to tax and the appropriations authority274 provide an inter-
esting backdrop to the division of power between the executive and 
legislative branches in our own Constitution, but they say absolutely 
nothing about Congress’s power to imprison an official for asserting 
the claim of executive privilege.  In fact, even in the very different 
context of English parliamentary history, Professor Chafetz cannot 
find a single example of Parliament imprisoning an official for assert-
ing a claim anything like the President’s claim of executive privilege.  
It simply overreaches for Professor Chafetz to argue that “[w]ith these 
[parliamentary] precedents in mind, and with no available evidence 
to the contrary, it seems reasonable to assume that the Founders un-
derstood Congress to have the authority to hold executive branch of-
ficers in contempt.”275 
2. Legislative Contempt in Pre-Constitutional America 
Professor Chafetz also argues that precedent for the use of con-
tempt of Congress against officials asserting executive privilege may 
be found in the practices of legislatures in America prior to the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution.  According to Professor Chafetz, the “co-
lonial assemblies were actually quite willing to use their contempt 
powers against Crown officials.”276  The examples cited by Professor 
Chafetz, however, such as arresting a provost marshal for ignoring a 
legislative order, arresting a council clerk for insolence, arresting the 
public printer for printing a resolution the legislature found offen-
sive, arresting the receiver of powder money for refusing to submit 
his accounts to the legislature, and arresting a military officer who 
continued to exercise the functions of his office after his removal277 
do not remotely establish a precedent for Congress’s use of contempt 
in an executive privilege dispute.  Neither the President nor the DOJ 
has ever questioned the existence of Congress’s contempt power, nor 
have they claimed that all executive officials are immune from con-
 
274 See id. at 1108–09 (discussing Parliament’s resistance to a tax levied by King Charles I in 
1628). 
275 Id. at 1145. 
276 Id. at 1121. 
277 Id. (referring to actions taken by the colonial governments of Massachusetts, North and 
South Carolina, and Virginia). 
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tempt of Congress, regardless of the cause or provocation.  The ex-
ecutive branch’s claim has been far more limited:  that immunity at-
taches only to an official who asserts the President’s claim of execu-
tive privilege.278  None of the examples cited by Professor Chafetz 
involved such a claim. 
Of course, colonial legislatures disputed efforts by royal governors 
to interfere with their prerogatives, just as Congress protests the Pres-
ident’s efforts to interfere with its prerogatives, but there is no pre-
constitutional precedent that is relevant to the current dispute.  Ex-
amples involving the use of the legislatures’ appropriations power279 
simply reinforce the argument that Congress has sufficient weapons 
to enforce its investigative demands without resorting to arrest of ex-
ecutive officials. 
3. Contempt of Congress and Executive Privilege under the United States 
Constitution 
Professor Chafetz particularly seems to overreach when he asserts 
that Congress has used its contempt power against executive officers, 
including a number of presidents.280  The first precedent cited by Pro-
fessor Chafetz involved President Jackson’s removal of federal money 
from the Second Bank of the United States and the deposit of the 
money into state banks.281  The Senate adopted a resolution that pro-
tested that the President had assumed a power not belonging to 
him.282  After Jackson replied in turn, the Senate passed a series of 
resolutions asserting that the President had overstepped his constitu-
tional authority and usurped powers belonging to Congress, that he 
had no right to make formal protests against votes or proceedings in 
the House of Congress, and that his protest constituted a “breach of 
 
278 See Cooper Memorandum, supra note 197, at 68 (“Congress may not, as a matter of statu-
tory or constitutional law, invoke the criminal contempt of Congress procedure against 
the head of an Executive agency acting on the President’s instructions to assert executive 
privilege in response to a congressional subpoena.”); Olson Memorandum, supra note 
194, at 101 (“[A] United States Attorney is not required to refer a congressional con-
tempt citation to a grand jury or otherwise to prosecute an Executive Branch official who 
carries out the President’s instruction to invoke the President’s claim of executive privi-
lege before a committee of Congress.”). 
279 See Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1122–23 (discussing how the Massachusetts Assembly lo-
wered and delayed paying the salaries of its governor and lieutenant governor in 1720 
and how in 1734 South Carolina’s House of Commons withheld the salary of the colony’s 
chief justice). 
280 See id. at 1132–43 (purporting to discuss contempt proceedings against executive branch 
officers). 
281 Id. at 1133. 
282 Id. 
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the privileges of the Senate.”283  This example does not even involve 
the use of Congress’s contempt power at all; it is simply a garden va-
riety separation of powers dispute between Congress and the Presi-
dent, where each side argues for the supremacy of its own constitu-
tional prerogatives.  It cannot remotely be considered precedent for 
the use of Congress’s contempt power in an executive privilege dis-
pute. 
Professor Chafetz next discusses a dispute between the House and 
President John Tyler over the contents of one of the President’s veto 
messages.284  After a congressional report recommended a constitu-
tional amendment that would permit Congress to override a presi-
dential veto by a simple majority, President Tyler protested that the 
House’s report made serious charges against him without him having 
the chance to reply.285  According to Professor Chafetz, the “House 
then resolved that the [P]resident had no right to make a protest 
against its votes or proceedings, and that the [President’s] protest 
message constituted a breach of the privileges of this House.”286  
Again, this example is simply a run-of-the-mill power struggle be-
tween the President and Congress over the extent of their respective 
constitutional prerogatives.  It did not even involve a hint of the use 
of Congress’s contempt power to imprison any member of the execu-
tive branch.  It is, like countless separation of powers disputes in the 
country’s history, simply a battle of words between the President and 
Congress. 
The next example involved a dispute in 1866 between James Fry, 
the Provost Marshal General of the Army, and Representative Roscoe 
Conkling.287  After Representative Conkling had referred to Fry as “an 
undeserving public servant” who had “turned the business of recruit-
ing and drafting into one carnival of corrupt disorder, into a paradise 
of coxcombs and thieves,”288 Fry wrote that Conkling’s animosity 
“arose altogether from my unwillingness to gratify him in certain mat-
ters in which he had a strong personal interest.  It is true, also, that 
he was foiled in efforts to obtain undue concessions from my bureau, 
and to discredit me in the eyes of my superiors.”289  The dispute was 
 
283 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing Congress’s re-
sponse to President Jackson’s assertion that “the only constitutional checks on the presi-
dency were impeachment, criminal trial, civil suit, and public opinion”). 
284 See id. at 1133–34. 
285 Id. at 1134. 
286 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
287 Id. at 1134–35. 
288 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2151 (1866). 
289 Id. at 2293. 
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referred to a House Committee, which reported two resolutions that 
were adopted by the House.  The first asserted that Fry’s allegations 
against Conkling were “wholly without foundation in truth.”290  The 
second resolution stated: 
General Fry, an officer of the Government of the United States, and head 
of one of its military bureaus, in writing and publishing these accusa-
tions . . . and which, owing to the crimes and wrongs which they impute 
to a Member of this body, are of a nature deeply injurious to the official 
and personal character, influence, and privileges of such Member, and 
their publication originating, as in the judgment of the House they did, 
in no misapprehension of facts, but in the resentment and passion of 
their author, was guilty of a gross violation of the privileges of such 
Member and of this House, and his conduct in that regard merits and 
receives its unqualified disapprobation.291 
Professor Chafetz then notes that Congress abolished the Provost 
Marshal General’s Bureau by statute the following month.292  But the 
incident did not involve any assertion of presidential prerogative or 
privilege, did not result in a citation for contempt of Congress, and 
did not contain any suggestion that Congress would have the power 
to imprison an officer for contempt. 
There have been two instances in which Congress actually did im-
prison an executive branch official for contempt of Congress.  These 
examples, which Professor Chafetz claims “have been generally neg-
lected by both judicial and academic commentators,”293 are the only 
instances in over 215 years of conflicts between the President and 
Congress in which Congress utilized its inherent contempt power to 
arrest an executive branch official.  Neither case, however, involved 
an assertion of executive privilege by the official; in fact, neither case 
involved a separation of powers dispute at all. 
The first incident involved a subpoena to George F. Seward (a ne-
phew of Secretary of State William H. Seward), who was then Minister 
to China.294  The House Committee on Expenditures in the State De-
partment commenced an investigation of Seward because it received 
evidence that he had misappropriated money received by the Shang-
hai Consulate.295  Seward’s counsel refused the committee’s demands 
for Seward’s books or his testimony on the ground that it violated 
 
290 3 HINDS, supra note 59, § 2687, at 1134. 
291 Id.; see also Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1135 (quoting the same resolution). 
292 Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1135. 
293 Id. at 1085. 
294 Id. at 1136. 
295 Id. at 1135–36 (arising from an affidavit by Seward’s successor in Shanghai alleging that 
books and records would show Seward’s misappropriation of funds). 
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Seward’s right against compelled self-incrimination.296  In response, 
the House adopted a contempt of Congress resolution, and Seward 
appeared before the full House, which voted to commit his reply to 
the Judiciary Committee and released him on his own recogniz-
ance.297  Although the committee that issued the original subpoena to 
Seward reported articles of impeachment,298 the House never voted 
on these articles.299  The Judiciary Committee issued a report that Se-
ward “should not be compelled to incriminate himself” during ongo-
ing impeachment proceedings.300  Although this incident involves the 
issuance of a contempt citation against an executive branch official, it 
lacks an essential element necessary to be a relevant precedent for 
the issue at hand:  the assertion by the executive official of the Presi-
dent’s claim of executive privilege.  Indeed, the only defense offered 
by Seward was his personal Fifth Amendment privilege, and the dis-
pute did not involve any separation of powers concerns.  The Olson 
Memorandum’s rationale for immunity from contempt is that it 
would impermissibly burden the President’s ability to assert executive 
privilege.301  Because this incident does not involve the assertion of 
any presidential prerogative, it cannot serve as a precedent for Con-
gress’s power to use its contempt authority in an executive privilege 
dispute. 
The last example cited by Professor Chafetz took place in 1916 
when the House cited H. Snowden Marshall, the United States Attor-
ney for the Southern District of New York, for contempt of Con-
gress.302  The dispute began in December of 1915 when Representa-
tive Frank Buchanan accused Marshall of high crimes and 
misdemeanors.303  Two weeks later, a federal grand jury in the South-
ern District of New York indicted Buchanan for violations of the 
 
296 Id. at 1136 (noting that this occurred after Seward’s counsel was unsuccessful in arguing 
that the committee lacked the authority to compel production of the books and records). 
297 Id. at 1136–37 (appearing before the full House, Seward “presented a written statement 
contending that the committee’s investigation was leading to impeachment charges”); see 
also 8 CONG. REC. H2138-44 (1879) (recording Seward’s appearance and the House’s re-
ferral to the Committee on the Judiciary). 
298 8 CONG. REC. H2350-51 (1879). 
299 Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1137. 
300 Id. 
301 See Olson Memorandum, supra note 194, at 102 (“If one House of Congress could make it 
a crime simply to assert the President’s presumptively valid claim, even if a court subse-
quently were to agree that the privilege claim were valid, the exercise of the privilege 
would be so burdened as to be nullified.”). 
302 Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1137. 
303 Id. 
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Sherman Antitrust Act.304  Buchanan then succeeded in establishing a 
committee to investigate alleged misconduct by Marshall.305  In the 
midst of the investigation, Marshall wrote a letter to the investigating 
committee acknowledging that he had been the source for an article 
accusing the committee of interfering with the antitrust investigation 
and charging the committee with conduct that the Supreme Court 
later described as “certainly unparliamentary and manifestly ill-
tempered[,] and which was well calculated to arouse the indignation 
not only of the members of the subcommittee[,] but of those of the 
House generally.”306  In response, the House adopted a contempt of 
Congress resolution and ordered the Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest Mar-
shall.307  The Supreme Court granted Marshall’s petition for habeas 
corpus and ordered him released from custody on the ground that: 
[T]he contempt was deemed to result from the writing of the letter not 
because of any obstruction to the performance of legislative duty result-
ing from the letter or because the preservation of the power of the House 
to carry out its legislative authority was endangered by its writing, but be-
cause of the effect and operation which the irritating and ill-tempered 
statements made in the letter would produce upon the public mind or 
because of the sense of indignation which it may be assumed was pro-
duced by the letter upon the members of the committee and of the 
House generally.  But to state this situation is to demonstrate that the 
contempt relied upon was not intrinsic to the right of the House to pre-
serve the means of discharging its legislative duties, but was extrinsic to 
the discharge of such duties and related only to the presumed operation 
which the letter might have upon the public mind and the indignation 
naturally felt by members of the committee on the subject.  But these 
considerations plainly serve to mark the broad boundary line which sepa-
rates the limited implied power to deal with classes of acts as contempts 
for self-preservation and the comprehensive legislative power to provide 
by law for punishment for wrongful acts.308 
On the basis of this decision, Professor Chafetz argues that 
“[n]either the House nor the Court seemed to have any doubt that 
the House could arrest and hold a federal prosecutor for actions 
which were truly within the scope of Congress’s contempt power, 
 
304 See United States ex rel. Marshall v. Gordon, 235 F. 422, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (denying 
Marshall’s writ of habeas corpus and discussing Buchanan’s indictments), rev’d, 243 U.S. 
521 (1917); Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1137. 
305 Marshall, 235 F. at 425 (discussing how a resolution by Buchanan resulted in the conven-
ing of a special committee to act on behalf of the Judiciary Committee in the matter); 
Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1137. 
306 Marshall, 243 U.S. at 531–32. 
307 Id. at 532. 
308 Id. at 545–46. 
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rightly construed.”309  Even if this statement were true (and it seems a 
stretch to reach that far based on the Supreme Court’s complete si-
lence on the issue), this case, like the previous one, not only does not 
involve a claim of executive privilege, it does not involve a separation 
of powers dispute between Congress and the executive branch.  In-
deed, this case does not even involve a congressional subpoena for 
documents or testimony.  Moreover, this case has hardly been, as Pro-
fessor Chafetz suggests, largely ignored by the commentators.310  The 
only reason that it has not been discussed at greater length is because 
the absence of any claim of executive privilege, and, indeed, the ab-
sence of an assertion of any executive branch prerogative, makes the 
case inapposite to the use of contempt in an executive privilege dis-
pute. 
4. The Absence of Contempt of Congress from the Long History of 
Executive Privilege Disputes Between Congress and the President 
The most significant constitutional precedents on the issue 
whether Congress may use its inherent contempt power in response 
to a claim of executive privilege are like Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s 
famously non-barking dog;311 they involve the absence of what would 
be expected if Congress believed it had such power.  In the long his-
tory of executive privilege disputes between Congress and the Presi-
dent, dating back to the last decade of the eighteenth century, Con-
gress has never used its inherent contempt power in response to a 
President’s claim of executive privilege. 
The history of the President’s assertion of what is now known as 
executive privilege312 to prevent disclosure of documents to Congress 
is even older than the legislature’s use of contempt of Congress to en-
force its prerogatives.  The most famous early assertion of the privi-
lege occurred in 1792 when a committee of the House of Representa-
tives investigating the failure of General St. Clair’s expedition against 
the Indians requested President Washington to produce all papers 
 
309 Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1139. 
310 See Peterson, supra note 111, at 570–71 n.41 (“Congress once used its inherent civil con-
tempt power to imprison an executive branch official when, in 1917, the district attorney 
for the Southern District of New York wrote an allegedly ‘defamatory and insulting’ letter 
to Congress.  This case, however, involved no claim of executive privilege.” (quoting Mar-
shall, 243 U.S. at 532) (citation omitted)). 
311 See SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE ADVENTURES AND THE MEMOIRS OF 
SHERLOCK HOLMES 309, 330 (2004). 
312 The term executive privilege was not used to describe these claims until the 1950s.  See 
Rozell, supra note 2, at 403 (“[The] phrase was not a part of the common language until 
President Eisenhower’s administration . . . .”). 
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relating to the St. Clair expedition.  Thomas Jefferson described the 
consensus of the first cabinet as follows: 
We had all considered, and were of one mind, first, that the House was 
an inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries.  Second, that it might 
call for papers generally.  Third, that the Executive ought to communi-
cate such papers as the public good would permit, and ought to refuse 
those, the disclosure of which would injure the public:  consequently 
were to exercise a discretion.  Fourth, that neither the committee nor 
House had a right to call on the Head of a Department, who and whose 
papers were under the President alone; but that the committee should 
instruct their chairman to move the House to address the President.313 
President Washington asked Jefferson to seek a compromise with 
Congress that would preserve the executive’s prerogative, while assur-
ing congressional access to important documents.  Ultimately, Jeffer-
son persuaded the House to request the President to “cause the 
proper officers to lay before this House such papers of a public na-
ture, in the Executive Department, as may be necessary to the investi-
gation of the causes of the failure of the late expedition under Major 
General St. Clair.”314  One scholar writing about the St. Clair dispute 
stated that “[t]his beginning of the executive privilege indi-
cates . . . the [P]resident could refuse documents because of their se-
cret nature, a category insisted upon by subsequent presidents ever 
since.”315  Although views differ on the extent to which this dispute 
represents a clear victory for the assertion of executive privilege,316 the 
incident shows that during the first decade of the Constitution, the 
executive and legislative branches each asserted constitutional pre-
rogatives relating to disclosure of executive branch documents and 
that the dispute was resolved by a negotiated agreement and not by 
even the threat of contempt of Congress. 
Similarly, in 1794, the Senate directed Secretary of State Edmund 
Randolph “to lay before the Senate the correspondences which have 
been had between the Minister of the United States at the Republic 
of France and said Republic, and between said Minister and the office 
 
313 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 303–04 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery 
Bergh eds., 1903). 
314 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 536 (1792). 
315 ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 31 (1974). 
316 Compare 6 Op. O.L.C. 751, 752 (1982) (“Although the Cabinet ‘agreed in this case, that 
there was not a paper which might not be properly produced,’ the President apparently 
felt it advisable nevertheless to negotiate with Congress a non-confrontational resolution 
of the problem.  Jefferson thereupon agreed to speak individually to members of the 
House committee . . . . [And his] conciliation efforts were successful.”), with BERGER. 
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEDGE:  A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH, supra note 114, at 167–72 (“It is 
another mark of slipshod advocacy that this incident should be cited for a ‘refusal’ of in-
formation.”). 
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of the Secretary of State.”317  Attorney General William Bradford 
wrote to the President that “it is the duty of the Executive to withhold 
such parts of the said correspondence as in the judgment of the Ex-
ecutive shall be deemed unsafe and improper to be disclosed.”318  Ul-
timately, President Washington responded to the Senate request by 
stating: 
After an examination of . . . [the correspondence], I directed copies and 
translations to be made, except in those particulars which, in my judg-
ment, for public considerations, ought not to be communicated. 
These copies and translations are now transmitted to the Senate, but the 
nature of them manifests the propriety of their being received as confi-
dential.319 
This pattern of negotiated compromise continued throughout the 
nineteenth century.  On a number of occasions, Congress expressly 
authorized the President to exclude material that he deemed neces-
sary to keep private.  For example, in 1807 the House investigated the 
Burr conspiracy and requested the President to: 
[L]ay before this House any information in possession of the Executive, 
except such as he may deem the public welfare to require not to be dis-
closed, touching any illegal combination of private individuals against the 
peace and safety of the Union, or any military expedition planned by 
such individuals against the territories of any Power in amity with the 
United States; together with the measures which the Executive has pur-
sued and proposes to take for suppressing or defeating the same.320 
In 1825, the House requested James Monroe to disclose information 
about the alleged misconduct of certain naval officers to the extent 
that he deemed the disclosure not to be incompatible with the public 
interest.321  Monroe responded that “a communication at this time of 
those documents would not comport with the public interest nor with 
what is due to the parties concerned.”322  In 1861, Congress requested 
President Lincoln to produce certain dispatches from Fort Sumter, “if 
in his opinion not incompatible with the public interest . . . .”323  One 
can argue about the extent to which these incidents revealed con-
 
317 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 38 (1794). 
318 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 494–95 (John C. Hamilton ed., New York, 
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320 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 336 (1807). 
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322 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 278 
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gressional deference to executive privilege,324 but they certainly dem-
onstrate negotiation and accommodation and not the unilateral as-
sertion of congressional hegemony. 
On other occasions, the President was more accommodating to 
Congress.  For example, in 1835, President Andrew Jackson refused 
to disclose to the Senate certain documents relating to the negotia-
tion of a boundary dispute with Canada.325  During the next session of 
Congress, however, the President disclosed the requested documents 
to the Senate and stated that “as the negotiation was undertaken un-
der the special advice of the Senate, I deem it improper to withhold 
the information which that body has requested, submitting to them 
to decide whether it will be expedient to publish the correspondence 
before the negotiation has been closed.”326 
During the nineteenth century, there were numerous instances in 
which Presidents refused to supply information or documents to 
Congress on the ground that disclosure would encroach on subjects 
exclusively belonging to the executive or otherwise detrimental to the 
operation of the government.327  President John Tyler refused to dis-
close to the House of Representatives information relating to ongo-
ing negotiations to settle Native-American claims against the United 
States government, and he expressly inserted his constitutional au-
thority to withhold such documents: 
The injunction of the Constitution that the President “shall take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed” necessarily confers an authority commen-
surate with the obligation imposed to inquire into the manner in which 
all public agents perform the duties assigned to them by law.  To be ef-
fective these inquiries must often be confidential.  They may result in the 
collection of truth or of falsehood, or they may be incomplete and may 
require further prosecution.  To maintain that the President can exercise 
no discretion as to the time in which the matters thus collected shall be 
 
324 Archibald Cox argued that these situations must be stricken from any list of historical 
precedents for Executive privilege because “there was no need for a claim of constitu-
tional right because there was no resistance to a congressional demand.”  Cox, supra note 
114, at 1397.  The Office of Legal Counsel disagreed, arguing that “[o]ne could just as 
well read the exception clause, however, as an early illustration of congressional recogni-
tion of the executive privilege.”  6 Op. O.L.C. 751, 755 n.15 (1982). 
325 3 COMPILATION, supra note 322, at 127 (“In answer to a resolution of the House of Repre-
sentatives . . . I have to acquaint the House that the negotiation for the settlement of the 
northeastern boundary being now in progress, it would, in my opinion, be incompatible 
with the public interest to lay before the House any communications which have been 
had between the two Governments since the period alluded to in the resolution.”). 
326 Id. at 230. 
327 See ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEDGE:  THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 114, at 36–37 (discussing examples from Presidents Fillmore, 
Grant, Lincoln, and Polk). 
134 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
promulgated . . . would deprive him at once of the means of performing 
one of the most salutary duties of his office . . . . To require from the Ex-
ecutive the transfer of this discretion to a coordinate branch of the Gov-
ernment is equivalent to the denial of its possession by him and would 
render him dependent upon that branch in the performance of a duty 
purely executive.328 
Even when Congress vigorously asserted its right to obtain execu-
tive branch documents and disputed the President’s claim of privi-
lege, it never asserted that it had the right to imprison for contempt 
the executive branch official responsible for withholding the docu-
ments.  During the administration of President Tyler, for example, 
the House of Representatives asserted the power to compel the pro-
duction of documents from the executive branch.329  Members of the 
House argued that the President did not have the right to withhold 
documents based on the assertion of executive privilege, but they 
claimed only the ultimate sanction of impeachment and never ar-
gued that the House had the right to arrest an executive branch offi-
cial for contempt of Congress.330  During the Polk Administration, the 
President claimed a privilege not to produce certain military and dip-
lomatic communications with Mexico after Congress had subpoenaed 
the documents.331  After President Polk’s claim of privilege, the House 
debated whether to continue to pursue access to the documents.332  A 
number of representatives agreed with Representative Adams, who 
asserted that 
this House ought to sustain, in the strongest manner, their right to call 
for information upon questions in which war and peace are concerned.  
They ought to maintain their right, and maintain it in a very distinct 
manner, against this assertion on the part of the President of the United 
States.333 
 
328 5 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1916, at 2075 
(James D. Richardson ed., Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1897). 
329 See 3 HINDS, supra note 59, § 1885, at 181 (adopting a resolution asking the President to 
give the House “the several reports lately made to the Department of War by Lieutenant-
Colonel Hitchcock relative to the affairs of the Cherokee Indians, together with all in-
formation communicated by him concerning the frauds he was charged to investigate; al-
so all facts in possession of the Executive from any source relating to the subject”). 
330 See id. at 182–85 (“The House of Representatives has the sole power of impeachment.  
The President himself, in the discharge of his most independent functions, is subject to 
the exercise of this power—a power which implies the right of inquiry on the part of the 
House to the fullest and most unlimited extent.”). 
331 CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1848). 
332 Id. at 166–70. 
333 Id. at 167 (statement of Rep. Adams). 
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Other representatives argued that the President rightfully with-
held the documents under a claim of privilege.334  Nowhere in this ex-
tended debate, however, did any member of Congress assert that the 
House had the authority to arrest an executive official for withhold-
ing the documents in response to the House subpoena.  The only 
remedy they recognized was the power to impeach the President.335  
For example, Representative Ingersoll stated:  “And who in such cases 
was to be the judge of the propriety of making the communications?  
The President was the judge.  And if the President exercised his dis-
cretion improperly, what remedy had this House?  This House had 
the power to impeach him, and that was all it could do.”336 
In an interesting precursor to the U.S. Attorneys dispute at the 
end of the George W. Bush Administration, in 1886, President Grover 
Cleveland adopted the opinion of his Attorney General that docu-
ments concerning the firing of a United States District Attorney 
should not be disclosed to the Senate and declined to produce the 
subpoenaed documents.337  Twenty-three years after the ensuing Se-
nate debate, one Senator called it “[t]he most remarkable discussion 
which was ever had upon this question [of the President’s right to 
withhold documents from Congress].”338  In the midst of the conten-
tious debate, even those senators who argued that the Senate had a 
right to obtain the documents acknowledged that if the President or-
dered them not to be produced, “there is no remedy,”339 and that 
their only option was the ultimate sanction of impeachment.340 
During the twentieth century, presidents continued to assert a 
constitutional right not to disclose documents to Congress.341  Presi-
 
334 Id. (statement of Rep. Holmes) (arguing that if President Polk “had revealed to this 
House, when there was a war between the two nations, all the correspondence, which was 
secret in its very nature . . . he would have withdrawn from himself, and the country, per-
haps, one of the surest means of restoring peace, by means of private persons”). 
335 Id. at 169. 
336 Id. at 169 (statement of Rep. Ingersoll). 
337 See EDWARD S. CORWIN ET AL., THE PRESIDENT:  OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984, at 429, 
475 (5th ed. 1984). 
338 43 CONG. REC. 841 (1909) (statement of Sen. Bacon). 
339 17 CONG. REC. 2,800 (1886) (statement of Sen. Logan). 
340 See 17 CONG. REC. 2,806–07 (1886) (statement of Sen. Van Wyke) (recognizing that im-
peachment is not proposed, but questioning what must be done in light of the Presi-
dent’s refusal to disclose information); 17 CONG. REC. 2,737 (1886) (statement of Rep. 
Voorhees) (arguing that when an executive official “is guilty of a violation of his official 
duty and of a subversion of the fundamental principles of the Government . . . I know no 
other proceeding provided by the Constitution in such a case than impeachment”). 
341 See ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEDGE:  THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 114, at 42–48 (discussing the assertion of executive privilege 
by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and others). 
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dent Theodore Roosevelt declined to produce documents in re-
sponse to a 1909 Senate request to the Attorney General concerning 
whether the DOJ had initiated a particular antitrust investigation: 
I have instructed the Attorney General not to respond to that portion of 
the resolution which calls for a statement of his reasons for non-action.  I 
have done so because I do not conceive it to be within the authority of 
the Senate to give directions of this character to the head of an executive 
department, or to demand from him reasons for his actions.  Heads of 
the executive departments are subject to the Constitution, and to the 
laws passed by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, and to the di-
rections of the President of the United States, but to no other direction 
what ever.342 
The most frequent assertions of executive privilege prior to the 
Nixon Administration occurred during the two terms of Dwight Ei-
senhower’s presidency.  President Eisenhower was the first to use the 
term “executive privilege,” and he utilized that doctrine on more 
than forty occasions.343  The most famous of these invocations of privi-
lege came during the Army-McCarthy hearings.  Congressional inves-
tigators requested information concerning discussions between an 
Army lawyer, top White House aides, and the Attorney General, but 
President Eisenhower instructed the Secretary of Defense not to allow 
employees to testify concerning those discussions: 
Because it is essential to efficient and effective administration that em-
ployees of the Executive Branch be in a position to be completely candid 
in advising with each other on official matters, and because it is not in 
the public interest that any of their conversations or communications, or 
any documents or reproductions, concerning such advice be disclosed, 
you will instruct employees of your Department that in all of their ap-
pearances before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations regarding the inquiry now before it they are not to 
testify to any such conversations or communications or to produce any 
 
342 S. DOC. NO. 60-635, at 2 (1909). 
343 MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:  PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 39 (2d ed. Univ. Press of Kan. 2002) (1994) [hereinafter ROZELL, 
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:  PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY AND ACCOUNTABILITY]; see also Ro-
bert Kramer & Herman Marcuse, Executive Privilege—A Study of the Period 1953–1960 (pts. 1 
& 2), 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 626 (1961), 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 827 (1961) (arguing 
“that the congressional power to investigate is not superior to executive privilege” and be-
lieving that the Founders did not “prefer[] Congress over the President here,” nor did 
“Congress’s power to create and abolish Executive agencies and to appropriate funds for 
their operation carries with it the absolute and unrestricted power to supervise, to inspect 
and to control the execution of laws to such an extent that executive privilege would be 
destroyed”). 
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such documents or reproductions.  This principle must be maintained 
regardless of who would be benefited by such disclosures.344 
President Eisenhower was particularly blunt in describing his re-
sponse to Senator McCarthy’s demands for information.  He advised 
a group of Republican legislators that “[a]ny man who testifies as to 
the advice he gave me won’t be working for me that night,” and went 
on to elaborate that “[t]hose people who have a position here in this 
government because of me, those people who are my confidential ad-
visors are not going to be subpoenaed.”345  Notwithstanding the dra-
matic and highly contentious nature of the Army-McCarthy hearings, 
at no time did Senator McCarthy respond to the President’s claims of 
privilege by threatening to seek a contempt of Congress citation 
against executive branch officials who refused to testify or disclose 
documents to his committee.  The reason for Congress’s failure to 
use either its inherent contempt power or the statutory alternative of 
criminal contempt of Congress was certainly not its general reluc-
tance to impose contempt sanctions.  During this period the Houses 
of Congress adopted contempt resolutions against private witnesses 
over a hundred times.346 
The Watergate era marked a change in the threatened use of con-
tempt of Congress citations against executive branch officials.  In the 
mid-1970s, congressional committees first began to raise the threat of 
contempt of Congress to enforce demands for information from the 
executive branch.  Interestingly, however, during the congressional 
investigations of Watergate itself, Congress never resorted to the 
sanction of contempt of Congress, in spite of numerous dramatic as-
sertions of executive privilege by President Nixon. 
It was not until 1982 that a House of Congress cited an executive 
branch official for contempt of Congress for asserting the President’s 
claim of executive privilege, and in that case Congress utilized the 
statutory criminal contempt process, not its own inherent authority to 
arrest the official.  The House cited EPA Director Anne Gorsuch for 
contempt of Congress after President Reagan directed Gorsuch to as-
sert executive privilege and withhold sixty-four documents in re-
sponse to a House committee subpoena.347  After the House cited 
 
344 Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States, to the Secretary of De-
fense Directing Him to Withhold Certain Information from the Senate Committee on 
Government Operations, 3 PUB. PAPERS 483–84 (May 17, 1954). 
345 FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE HIDDEN-HAND PRESIDENCY:  EISENHOWER AS LEADER 205 (1982). 
346 See BECK, supra note 63, at 14. 
347 See H.R. REP. NO. 97–968, at 15 (1982). 
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Administrator Gorsuch for contempt,348 the U.S. Attorney refused to 
refer the contempt citation to a grand jury.349  In response to the con-
tempt citation against Administrator Gorsuch, the DOJ’s OLC issued 
the Olson Memorandum, which reached two principal conclusions:  
(1) Congress could not constitutionally compel the executive branch 
to initiate criminal proceedings against a particular individual, and 
(2) it would be unconstitutional to prosecute an executive branch 
official for contempt of Congress for asserting the President’s claim 
of executive privilege.350  OLC later issued the Cooper Memorandum, 
which stated that, based upon the findings of the Olson Memoran-
dum, the DOJ would not refer to a grand jury any contempt citation 
issued against an executive official who asserted the President’s claim 
of executive privilege.351  Thus, in response to Congress’s first asser-
tion of its authority to utilize the contempt of Congress statute in an 
executive privilege dispute, the executive branch immediately con-
tested that power and determined that Congress had no constitution-
al authority to utilize the contempt statute in such a manner.  Subse-
quently, Congress has attempted to utilize the contempt of Congress 
statute in response to the President’s claim of executive privilege on 
several occasions, and in each case, the DOJ has cited the Olson and 
Cooper Memoranda and refused to proceed further with the con-
tempt citation.  Thus, the executive branch has not only failed to ac-
quiesce in Congress’s attempted use of the statute, but has vigorously 
disputed Congress’s authority to do so. 
Even after having been frustrated in its attempted use of the con-
tempt of Congress statute, however, Congress never attempted to util-
ize its inherent contempt authority to enforce its claim for documents 
in an executive privilege dispute.  We do not know Congress’s reasons 
for failing to utilize this procedure.  Congress may have recognized 
the futility of the inevitable standoff that would result from such an 
effort, or it may have concluded that it would be politically unwise to 
assert its own unilateral power to arrest the official rather than seek 
 
348 See H.R. Res. 632, 97th Cong. (1982), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 98–323, at 9–10 (1983). 
349 See Examining and Reviewing the Procedures That Were Taken by the Office of the U.S. Attorney for 
D.C. in Their Implementation of a Contempt Citation That Was Voted by the Full House of Repre-
sentatives Against the Then Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Anne Gorsuch 
Burford:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 98th Cong. 29–30 
(1984). 
350 See Olson Memorandum, supra note 194, at 102 (“[A]s a matter of statutory interpretation 
and the constitutional separation of powers, we believe that the contempt of Congress sta-
tute was not intended to apply and could not constitutionally be applied to an Executive 
Branch official who asserts the President’s claim of executive privilege in this context.”). 
351 See Cooper Memorandum, supra note 197, at 85. 
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judicial punishment for the decision to ignore the subpoena.  The 
important fact is that, for whatever reason, Congress has never at-
tempted to arrest an executive branch official for asserting the Presi-
dent’s claim of executive privilege in response to a congressional 
subpoena.  Thus, not only is there no historical support for Con-
gress’s use of such authority, Congress’s repeated failure to use its 
power in the context of hundreds of executive privilege disputes is 
strong evidence that Congress possesses no such authority. 
B. Congress’s Need to Utilize its Inherent Contempt Power in Executive 
Privilege Disputes 
As previously noted, the recent advocates of Congress’s use of its 
inherent contempt power in executive privilege disputes have argued 
that the power is necessary in order for Congress to protect its right 
to investigate the executive branch.  Josh Chafetz has argued that “in 
order for this oversight power to be effective in rooting out executive 
branch malevolence and incompetence, Congress must have access to 
precisely that information that the executive does not wish to turn 
over—that is, it must have the power to hold executive branch offi-
cials in contempt.”352  Michael Zuckerman has echoed this argument: 
Congress can hardly accept Executive prosecutorial discretion stonewal-
ling its contempt citations.  Doing so has thwarted public accountability 
in cases where Congress has been unable to obtain the information that 
it desired.  Especially when investigating the Executive Branch, delegat-
ing to the [DOJ] . . . the task of enforcing subpoenas “leaves Congress 
beholden to hostile Executive Branch officials” whose own administra-
tion might be under investigation.  Even with regard to the judiciary, de-
legating the punishment power of the Congress to the judiciary through 
prosecution in federal court may result in “impermissible judicial med-
dling into the internal rules and procedures of the Houses.”  In the end, 
undue interference by either the Executive or the courts cannot be in the 
national interest, since the preservation of a strong direct contempt pow-
er serves the interests of the People.353 
This gloomy view of Congress’s ability to enforce its investigative 
demands against the executive branch is not shared by the principal 
institutional advocate for Congress’s constitutional prerogatives.  
Louis Fisher, the leading separation of powers expert at the Congres-
sional Research Service and the most respected proponent of con-
gressional power, conducted a thorough review of clashes between 
the executive branch and Congress over the scope of Congress’s in-
 
352 Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1145. 
353 Zuckerman, supra note 18, at 64. 
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vestigative power.354  His ultimate conclusion was that “Congress can 
win most of the time—if it has the will—because its political tools are 
formidible.”355 
Indeed, Congress has been so effective at forcing the executive 
branch to comply with investigative demands that a number of scho-
lars have argued that it is the President who needs additional protec-
tion in order to protect his constitutional prerogatives.  In 1997, for 
example, Randall Miller argued that: 
A fair assessment of the battles between Congress and the executive 
branch over access to documents, however, reveals that, without access to 
a civil proceeding, the President cannot effectively assert executive privi-
lege to resist disclosure once a dispute with Congress escalates beyond 
the subpoena stage.356 
Thus, Miller argued, because the President is so powerless during the 
negotiation and accommodation process, courts should agree to ad-
judicate executive disputes in order to protect the President’s pre-
rogative.357  William Marshall has argued: 
An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked 
Executive, generates its own abuses.  Unfortunately, the practices cur-
rently governing Congress’s use of this power have evolved to the point 
where there are few effective constraints on its exercise; highly partisan 
committees, for example, can initiate and pursue investigations of the 
President without so much as a debate.  The invitation for congressional 
abuse is therefore apparent.358 
As a result, Professor Marshall argues in favor of increased procedural 
checks on Congress’s investigative power in order to prevent congres-
sional overreaching and protect essential executive prerogatives.359 
The history of executive privilege disputes in the last thirty years 
can help to explain how Miller and Marshall could reach conclusions 
so diametrically opposed to those of Chafetz and Zuckerman.  With 
respect to the dispute involving EPA Administrator Gorsuch, Zuck-
erman argues that, along with the Miers and Bolten cases, the dispute 
shows that “the Executive’s refusal to prosecute may result in unre-
medied obstruction to the legislative process, making a ‘mockery’ of 
the legislative power.”360  Yet, far from being an example of Congress’s 
need to utilize its inherent contempt power, the Gorsuch case is a 
 
354 See FISHER, supra note 24, at 160–95. 
355 Louis Fisher, Congressioinal Access to Information:  Using Legislative Will and Leverage, 52 
DUKE L.J. 323, 325 (2002). 
356 Miller, supra note 114, at 670. 
357 Id. at 679. 
358 Marshall, supra note 28, at 784. 
359 Id. at 820. 
360 Zuckerman, supra note 18, at 63. 
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prime example of why Congress prevails in executive privilege battles 
even without the ultimate sanction of contempt.  The DOJ did not 
simply refuse to prosecute Gorsuch for contempt and then stonewall 
the congressional investigating committee.  Instead, the Department 
filed a lawsuit, rather provocatively styled United States v. House of Rep-
resentatives,361 in order to seek a declaratory judgment that the asser-
tion of executive privilege should prevail over the congressional sub-
poena.362  The district court rejected the Department’s attempt to 
seek judicial resolution of the dispute and urged the parties to nego-
tiate: 
The difficulties apparent in prosecuting Administrator Gorsuch for con-
tempt of Congress should encourage the two branches to settle their dif-
ferences without further judicial involvement.  Compromise and cooper-
ation, rather than confrontation, should be the aim of the parties.363 
Within two weeks, without the use of its coercive contempt power 
and without any judicial intervention, Congress succeeded in obtain-
ing all of the subpoenaed documents.364  President Reagan acknowl-
edged that political pressure generated by Congress and the press 
had forced him to release the documents to Congress: 
[I]t is now clear that prolonging this legal debate can only result in a 
slowing down of the release of information to Congress, therefore foster-
ing suspicion in the public mind that, somehow, the important doctrine 
of executive privilege is being used to shield possible wrong doing.365 
Stanley Brand, counsel to the Clerk of the House of Representatives, 
called the President’s decision to release the documents a “total capi-
tulation.”366 
The House not only succeeded in obtaining all of the requested 
documents, but its Judiciary Committee also launched a probe into 
the DOJ’s actions during the Gorsuch controversy, including its role 
in advising President Reagan to assert executive privilege.367  The Ju-
diciary Committee, without the use of any contempt sanctions, forced 
 
361 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).  Stanley Brand, counsel to the clerk of the House of Rep-
resentatives at the time the lawsuit was filed, noted that “[w]hen the Department of Jus-
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enjoin and declare illegal a House contempt citation against the EPA administrator for 
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the DOJ to disclose its own internal documents concerning the asser-
tion of privilege and required the officials involved in the dispute to 
testify under oath.368  Ultimately, the Judiciary Committee’s report ac-
cused Assistant Attorney General Theodore B. Olson of giving false 
and misleading testimony at his appearance before the Committee on 
March 10, 1983.369  This report led to an independent counsel investi-
gation of Olson, who was exonerated only after a prolonged three-
year investigation.370  As Randall Miller later noted, the Judiciary 
Committee investigation  
promised to cause future executive branch attorneys to think twice about 
recommending that a president assert executive privilege.  The Olson in-
vestigation suggests that a sufficiently motivated faction in Congress can 
effectively punish executive officers for an assertion of executive privilege 
by launching an investigation into the propriety of the assertion of the 
privilege itself.371   
Thus, rather than supporting the argument that Congress needs 
coercive contempt authority in order to obtain documents from the 
executive branch, the Gorsuch episode rather spectacularly supports 
precisely the opposite conclusion. 
President Reagan was equally unsuccessful in asserting executive 
privilege following the nomination of then-Associate Justice William 
H. Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  During 
Rehnquist’s confirmation hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
demanded that the DOJ disclose memoranda prepared when he was 
in charge of the OLC during the first years of the Nixon Administra-
tion.372 President Reagan asserted executive privilege on the ground 




370 See Ronald J. Ostrow, Independent Counsel Explains Why She Didn’t Prosecute Figure in ‘83 EPA 
Probe, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1989, at A17. 
371 Miller, supra note 114, at 660.  The in terroram effect of the Olson investigation was made 
explicit by the comments of one former White House official who spoke at a symposium 
on congressional oversight: 
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with members of a congressional investigative staff the niceties of legal questions 
involving whether they were entitled to see certain predecisional draft documents; 
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  Symposium, Reforming Government Through Oversight:  A Good or Bad Idea?, 13 J.L. & POL. 
557, 574 (1997). 
372 See Howard Kurtz & Ruth Marcus, Democrats Seek to Subpoena Papers, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 
1986, at A1 (reporting the steps taken to subpoena Chief Justice-designate Rehnquist’s 
papers from the Nixon Administration). 
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House.373  The Judiciary Committee refused to proceed on Rehn-
quist’s nomination until it received the documents and, within five 
days after President Reagan’s assertion of privilege, the Committee 
had all of the documents.374 
President Clinton was spectacularly unsuccessful in asserting ex-
ecutive privilege claims.375  President Clinton lost highly publicized 
battles in the courts to establish a temporary immunity to civil suit,376 
a “protective function privilege” for secret service agents,377 and an at-
torney/client privilege with respect to advice given to the President 
by White House lawyers.378  In addition, President Clinton lost some 
notable executive privilege battles with Congress.  For example, in 
1996, the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee be-
gan an investigation into allegations that personnel in the White 
House Travel Office had been fired for political reasons, and the 
committee subpoenaed documents from the White House.379  The 
White House produced over 40,000 pages of documents, but asserted 
executive privilege and refused to disclose approximately 3,000 pages 
of documents to the Committee.380  In an attempt to avoid a House 
vote on the contempt of Congress resolution against White House 
counsel Jack Quinn, to whom the subpoena had been directed, the 
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White House produced approximately 1,000 additional pages of doc-
uments and a privilege log with an index of the remaining undis-
closed documents.381  Eventually, however, the political pressure be-
came too intense for the White House to resist and, on June 25, 1996, 
the White House agreed to provide the Committee with access to the 
remaining documents under an agreement that allowed the Commit-
tee to take notes on the documents but not copy them unless they re-
lated to improper contacts with the FBI.382 
The George W. Bush Administration was only partially successful 
in asserting executive privilege even with a Republican majority in 
Congress.  In 2001 the House Committee on Government Reform 
conducted hearings into allegations of FBI corruption in its Boston 
office with respect to organized crime investigations during the 1960s 
and 1970s.383  The committee, chaired by Republican Dan Burton, 
demanded access to ten particularly crucial documents relating to the 
potential misconduct.384  President Bush asserted executive privilege 
in order to protect the confidentiality of the FBI documents.385  Ulti-
mately, the two sides reached an accommodation that allowed the 
House committee to view six of the ten disputed documents.386  Thus, 
even with a sympathetic Republican-dominated committee, President 
Bush was forced to compromise on his claim of privilege. 
The reasons for Congress’s ability to obtain executive branch 
documents, even without imprisoning executive branch officials, have 
been well documented.  Louis Fisher  has suggested that judicial en-
forcement of congressional investigative demands is rarely necessary 
because “of the superior political muscle by a Congress determined 
to exercise the many coercive tools available to it.”387  These powers 
include Congress’s appropriation power,388 Congress’s impeachment 
power,389 Congress’s power to refuse to confirm presidential nomi-
nees,390 and the political pressure that Congress can generate when it 
 
381 Eric Schmitt, White House Gives Committee More Papers in Dismissal Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 
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383 See Investigation into Allegations of Justice Department Misconduct in New England, Vol. 1:  Hear-
ings Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. (2001). 
384 See Rozell & Sollenberger, Bush Administration, supra note 200, at 6–7 (discussing the deal 
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385 See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Claims Executive Privilege in Response to House Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 14, 2001, at A26 (discussing President Bush’s first invocation of executive privilege). 
386 Rozell & Sollenberger, Bush Administration, supra note 200, at 7. 
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389 Id. at 333–35. 
390 Id. at 336–39. 
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issues a subpoena and initiates contempt proceedings, even if the ex-
ecutive branch refuses to proceed with prosecution of a contempt ci-
tation.391  As a result, Fisher concludes that “Congress has the theoret-
ical edge because of the more than adequate tools at its disposal.  
What it needs primarily is motivation, the staying power to cope with 
a long and frustrating battle, and an abiding commitment to honor 
its constitutional purpose.”392 
Congress’s political weapons are amplified by the media, which is 
generally hostile to presidential invocations of executive privilege and 
which effectively keeps the issue of a disclosure in the public eye.  As 
William Marshall has noted: 
Congress also has an institutional ally assisting it in its oversight re-
quests—the media.  This is critically important because, in a political bat-
tle, public opinion is often the referee and the media is the vehicle 
through which public opinion will be informed.  That the media will 
generally be on the side of disclosure is, of course, not surprising, be-
cause the business of the media is to seek information and, as such, it is 
institutionally disposed to favor disclosure in any given case.393 
Moreover, the press has become increasingly focused on “scandal 
journalism” since Watergate and thus has an institutional predilec-
tion towards focusing on allegations of corruption or coverups.  As 
one observer noted,  
[t]his scandal obsessed industry, whether it is on radio, TV, or in the 
print media, generates tremendous pressure on the congressional inves-
tigatory system:  (1) to identify potential scandals; (2) to commence in-
vestigations of them; (3) to appoint the ‘right people’ to run those inves-
tigations; and (4) to leak information regarding the investigative 
process.394   
As a result: 
[B]ecause of the media, the purported trump card in the President’s 
hand, the claim of executive privilege, is actually a joker.  Because the 
press (and to a lesser extent, the Congress) equates a claim of executive 
privilege with that of a cover-up, the result is that the claim of executive 
privilege has become a political liability to the President who invokes it.395 
 
391 Id. at 339–59. 
392 Id. at 401. 
393 Marshall, supra note 28, at 810; see also Peterson, supra note 111, at 628–29 (“Once a dis-
pute reaches the subpoena level, the press becomes a major factor in the political con-
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terests and quite skeptical of claims of executive privilege.”). 
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Constant comparisons to Watergate396 and editorial opposition to as-
sertions of executive privilege397 add to the news coverage and further 
increase the political pressure on the President to abandon his asser-
tion of privilege.  Thus, it is hardly surprising that Congress has done 
so well in overcoming executive branch resistance to its investigative 
demands. 
III.  THE ARGUMENT THAT CONGRESS SHOULD ALWAYS PREVAIL IN ANY 
DISPUTE OVER ACCESS TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFORMATION 
The final, and most telling, flaw with the arguments for Congress’s 
use of its inherent contempt authority is that they rest on the assump-
tion that Congress’s investigative claims are always superior to the 
President’s claim of privilege and that Congress should have the right 
to determine unilaterally when the executive must disclose informa-
tion as to which the President has asserted a claim of executive privi-
lege.  Heidi Kitrosser has made this presumption explicit in a recent 
article in which she argues that Congress’s determination that docu-
ments should be disclosed should be constitutionally conclusive.398  
According to Kitrosser, Congress is constitutionally permitted to 
overcome executive privilege in three ways: 
First, Congress can pass statutes granting the public access rights to cate-
gories of executive branch information.  Second, Congress can pass sta-
tutes giving itself and its committees and subcommittees subpoena pow-
er, subject to contempt penalties, to seek information from the executive 
branch.  Third, Congress can create agencies similarly empowered to 
demand information from the executive branch.399 
Because Congress’s right to seek information should always prevail 
over executive branch assertions of privilege, Kitrosser argues, if law-
suits arise out of Congress’s contempt proceedings “any executive 
privilege claims made in response should not prevail.”400  Thus, Ki-
trosser concludes: 
[I]t is theoretically significant to accord legislative access decisions consti-
tutionally final and enforceable status.  The according of such status 
could highlight the underlying logic outlined throughout this paper:  
that executive privilege clashes fundamentally are policy debates about 
the merits of secrecy versus openness, that constitutional structure sug-
gests that skepticism as to pro-secrecy arguments is called for, and that 
 
396 See Miller, supra note 114, at 673 (discussing congressional members’ tendency to view an 
assertion of exective privilege as part of an intrabranch battle). 
397 Id. at 671–73. 
398 Kitrosser, supra note 19, at 492–93. 
399 Id. at 528. 
400 Id. at 528 n.187. 
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constitutional structure ultimately militates toward resolving such policy 
debates through legislation to ensure stable political mechanisms to keep 
secrecy shallow and politically checkable.401 
This argument, and the parallel arguments in favor of the use of 
Congress’s inherent contempt power, are essentially arguments that 
there is no constitutional basis for executive privilege or that, at most, 
Congress has the conclusive right to determine whether executive 
privilege should be recognized.  It is beyond the scope of this Article 
to revisit the issue whether the President has any constitutional right 
to assert executive privilege, a subject about which entire books have 
been written.402  It will suffice for the present purposes to make a few 
observations in response to the suggestion that Congress should al-
ways prevail.  First, the argument that the President has no constitu-
tionally based privilege is inconsistent with both Supreme Court case 
law and the long history of presidential assertions of privilege, some 
of which have prevailed through congressional acquiescence and 
some of which have not.403  Second, if one assumes that the President 
has some right to assert executive privilege and Congress has a cor-
responding right to investigate the executive branch, then whatever 
mechanism is utilized to resolve confrontation between the constitu-
tional rights cannot be committed exclusively to one of the compet-
ing branches.  As Congress’s own strongest advocate, Louis Fisher, 
has pointed out: 
These implied powers collide whenever Congress, in an attempt to carry 
out its investigative function, is denied information by a President who 
invokes executive privilege.  Which power should yield?  It would be satis-
fying to discover a formula that is both unequivocal and trustworthy, but 
too much depends on individual circumstances.  To subordinate one 
branch to another would destroy their co-equal status and disrupt the sys-
tem of separated powers.  We are left with a search for general bounda-
ries and guideposts that satisfy constitutional principles as well as practic-
al realities.404 
Moreover, the arguments in favor of Congress’s constitutionally 
conclusive right to determine all disputes over executive privilege rest 
on several faulty presumptions about the way such a process would 
operate.  First, the advocates of congressional hegemony implicitly, 
and at times explicitly, argue that Congress can be trusted both to ad-
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judicate the President’s claim of privilege fairly and not to abuse its 
investigative power, even if it always has the final say on what informa-
tion must be produced.  For example, Josh Chafetz has argued that 
“[n]onjudicial institutions can still behave judiciously, and, as we have 
seen, the congressional committees investigating Nixon were careful 
to behave in such a manner.  Indeed, so were the congressional 
committees investigating the United States Attorneys firings.”405 
This faith in Congress’s ability to respond fairly and dispassionate-
ly to presidential claims of privilege would strike any experienced ob-
server of Washington politics as less than accurate, to say the least.  
Congress has a huge incentive to use its investigative power “to en-
gage in political mischief.”406  Indeed, as William Marshall (who 
should be in a position to know, having served as a Deputy Counsel to 
the President in the Clinton White House) has pointed out even 
when investigations uncover no wrongdoing they: 
[M]ay inflict political damage on a president.  They can embarrass his 
administration; distract from his agenda; undercut his authority; trigger 
further inquires; and lead to lapses or errors in compliance.  They can do 
all of this (and more) with little or no cost to those who choose to wield 
the investigative power.  It is no wonder, then, that in times of divided 
government, congressional investigations are a political weapon of 
choice.407 
Complaints about Congress’s incentive to politicize the investiga-
tive process and unfairly target the executive branch have come from 
both sides of the political aisle.  Theodore Olson (head of the OLC in 
the Reagan Administration and President Bush’s first Solicitor Gen-
eral) has argued that Congress utilizes its investigative authority to in-
terfere with the President’s right to supervise officials within the ex-
ecutive branch.408  This type of interference was testified to by an 
audience member at the Symposium at which Mr. Olson spoke: 
I wanted to follow on the point that Ted Olson made about the potential 
threat to separation of powers through the misuse of the oversight 
process.  When I was serving in the Bush administration at EPA, as Gen-
eral Counsel, I was told that if I made a certain interpretative decision, I 
would be investigated.  I did not make that decision; I was investigated.  
That seems to me to be a very clear misuse of the process . . . . I think 
we’d all agree that, increasingly, the game is being played in a very nasty 
way.409 
 
405 Chafetz, supra note 18, at 1155. 
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Professor Christopher Schroeder (who has experience in both 
branches as acting head of the OLC and Chief Counsel of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee) has characterized some congressional investiga-
tions as “vendetta oversight, oversight that seems primarily interested 
in bringing someone down, usually someone close to the President or 
perhaps the President himself.”410  Schroeder also noted that the in-
creasing amount of oversight aimed solely at inflicting damage on the 
opposition leads “inevitably . . . to . . . a movement towards partisan 
divisions which are not productive.”411  Given these persuasive first-
hand observations of the political context of information disputes, it 
is simply not plausible to assume that Congress, with all of its political 
incentives to attack the President (at least a President of an opposing 
party) would ever give a fair hearing to a President’s claims of privi-
lege.  Each member has an individual incentive to maximize his or 
her chance of getting reelected and, if an investigation can inflict 
damage on the opposition party, not only does that bring publicity to 
the individual member, but also additional funding and support from 
within the member’s own party.  As a result, oversight has become in-
creasingly partisan and focused on inflicting damage on the opposi-
tion party.412 
Examples of such partisan investigations abound.  The so-called 
Whitewater Hearings, initiated to investigate President Clinton’s in-
volvement in an allegedly suspicious land deal while he was governor 
of Arkansas, went on for years and encompassed subjects so far afield 
that they bore no relationship to the original purpose of the investi-
gation.  For example, one witness was originally called to testify about 
his knowledge of the Whitewater land deal, but by the time of his 
fourth appearance before the Whitewater Committee, the question-
ing had turned to the 1985 procurement of the Arkansas state police 
radio system.413  Republicans might make a similar claim about the 
House Judiciary Committee’s investigation of the DOJ’s decision to 
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assert executive privilege in the Gorsuch case during the Reagan 
Administration.414 
The advocates of congressional hegemony, however, make no 
mention of even the most obvious examples of congressional abuse of 
the investigative process.  For example, Michael Zuckerman has ar-
gued: 
To the extent fairness is a concern, Congress is aware of the potential for 
abuse of this process and has acted to minimize this risk; of the fifteen 
persons charged with failure to comply with subpoenas between the pe-
riod 1787–1943, none was referred to the courts and only two were pu-
nished by Congress—showing that Congress is not a lawless body; it exer-
cises restraint.415 
The choice of this time period conveniently omitted the post-war 
period during which the House Un-American Activities Committee 
and Senate investigations conducted by Senator Joseph McCarthy re-
sulted in hundreds of citations for contempt of Congress and the 
subsequent imprisonment of those cited.416  By some estimates 10,000 
to 12,000 people lost their jobs as a result of the McCarthy-era inves-
tigations.417  In the film and television industry alone, over 300 people 
lost their jobs and were blacklisted from further employment.418  One 
could go on at length about the devastation caused by these congres-
sional investigations; it is enough for the purpose of this Article to 
state that history dramatically and conclusively refutes the notion that 
the congressional investigation is invariably benign and conducted in 
a responsible manner. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the evidence of the potential abuse 
of Congress’s investigative power arises in the context of a relation-
ship with the executive branch in which each party has an acknowl-
edged constitutional interest and the Supreme Court has blessed nei-
ther interest as absolute.  If Congress were given the conclusive 
constitutional authority to determine what information should be 
disclosed by the executive branch, it seems likely that investigative 
overreaching would increase dramatically.  At the moment, Con-
gress’s demands are moderated by the negotiation and accommoda-
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tion process, which constrains both branches in the assertion of their 
constitutional authority.  A Congress possessing absolute and unli-
mited authority to command disclosure of documents would be li-
mited only by the political process, which, as we have seen, is a frail 
constraint at best.419 
IV.  WHY THE COURTS SHOULD RESIST A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN 
RESOLVING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE DISPUTES BETWEEN CONGRESS AND 
THE PRESIDENT 
The final question to address is the issue of the justiciability of ex-
ecutive privilege disputes between Congress and the President.  The 
conventional wisdom has been that the courts should stay out of this 
process and that the branches should be left to reach a negotiated 
resolution of the dispute.  David O’Neil has recently argued, however, 
that the conventional wisdom is deeply flawed and that the courts 
“must play some substantive role in a coherent system for resolving 
interbranch battles over information.”420  O’Neil’s argument can be 
summed up as follows:  First, the traditional negotiation-
accommodation model of resolving executive privilege disputes is 
based on a theory identical to that first articulated by Professor Her-
bert Wechsler in the context of federalism.421  Just as Wechsler argued 
that state interests are adequately protected in Congress because the 
composition of the legislature is designed to reflect and protect local 
interests, the negotiation-accommodation theory is based on the no-
tion that the members of Congress will adequately protect their own 
interests during executive privilege disputes.422  Second, executive pri-
vilege disputes are not fundamentally different from other separation 
of powers disputes that the court has resolved.423  Third, the negotia-
tion-accommodation process incorrectly assumes that Congress will 
protect its own institutional prerogative with respect to gathering in-
formation despite the fact that political incentives are not necessarily 
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consistent with the institutional interest of Congress.424  Therefore, 
the constitutional prerogatives of Congress will not be adequately 
protected by leaving executive privilege disputes to resolution via the 
political process.425  Fourth, because the political process alone will 
not yield a satisfactory allocation of authority, courts must intervene 
to establish the appropriate constitutional prerogatives of the execu-
tive and legislative branches.426 
Looking to each of these arguments in turn, it becomes apparent 
that judicial involvement in executive privilege disputes is not desira-
ble and that the disputes should be resolved through negotiations be-
tween the President and Congress.  First, there is good reason why no 
one previously has thought to conflate Wechsler’s political safeguards 
theory with the negotiation-accommodation approach to executive 
privilege.  Wechsler’s approach was theoretical and deductive.  He 
argued, based on assumptions about the motivations of individual 
legislators, that the state’s interests should, as a logical matter, be 
adequately represented in Congress.427  Later critiques of Wechsler’s 
model were based on the observation that the motivations of individ-
ual legislators were based much more on partisan politics than fealty 
to the values of federalism.428  On the other hand, the negotiation-
accommodation theory of executive privilege is based upon inductive 
logic, by those who have participated in the process and observed 
how Congress and the executive branch interact with one another in 
executive privilege disputes.429  Of course, the actions of each branch 
are influenced by politics and not purely the desire to represent the 
institutional interests of Congress or the President.  As Dawn Johnsen 
has noted: 
The reality of congressional oversight of the executive branch is not a 
neat theoretical world but one that requires the messy give and take of 
negotiations.  The institutional conflicts and political motivations some-
times inherent in this aspect of the relationship between the President 
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and Congress are best resolved through a process that allows for flexibili-
ty, a balancing of competing interests, and compromise.430 
Second, there are important differences between executive privi-
lege disputes and other separation of powers questions heard by the 
courts that warrant judicial restraint in addressing the former.  The 
separation of powers disputes that are heard by the courts generally 
involve the constitutionality of statutes that either unlawfully aggran-
dized the power of a branch by giving it authority not permitted by 
the Constitution,431 or that arguably restrict the authority of a branch 
so that it is unable to perform its assigned constitutional functions.432 
These cases involve essentially a binary choice; the statute is either 
constitutional or unconstitutional, and a court is well equipped to 
make the constitutional assessment of the statute at issue.  Executive 
privilege disputes, however, involve an infinite variety of fact patterns 
and institutional interests.  The proper method to resolve such a dis-
pute would require a court to balance the need of the congressional 
committee for access to the documents against the impact on the ex-
ecutive branch if it is required to turn over the documents.433  Courts 
have a difficult enough time weighing the impact on their own ability 
to conduct judicial proceedings when the President asserts a claim of 
executive privilege;434 it is far more difficult for them to assess the rel-
ative impact on each of the two political branches in an executive pri-
vilege dispute. 
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More important than the court’s inability to assess the relative 
weight to be assigned each branch’s claim is the reality that a court is 
far less able to fashion the appropriate remedy for such a case.  A case 
involving the validity of a statute presents a relatively simple remedial 
problem.  The statute is either constitutional or unconstitutional, and 
the biggest problem a court typically has is deciding whether an un-
constitutional provision is severable.  By contrast, executive privilege 
disputes, particularly as they are resolved through the negotiation-
accommodation process, have innumerable possible outcomes.  
These disputes almost never result in total complete unfettered 
access by Congress or complete success on the part of the executive 
branch in blocking any congressional access to documents.  More typ-
ically, a negotiated settlement of an executive privilege dispute will 
involve a long list of variables, including the number of documents to 
be produced, the identity and function of the persons who will be 
permitted to have access to the documents, whether documents may 
be copied or whether notes may be taken, whether the documents 
will be redacted and, if so, whether anyone will be able to view the 
unredacted originals, the length of time the documents will be made 
available, and whether and when the documents might be made 
available to the public.  Each one of these variables has endless possi-
ble alternatives.  For example, a document might be available to the 
full committee and entire staff or only to the committee members, or 
only to selected committee members or only to the chair of the 
committee and the ranking minority member of the committee and 
staff or only to the chair of the committee and the ranking member 
of the committee, or only to the chair of the committee.  The details 
of these arrangements are always carefully negotiated by the repre-
sentatives of Congress and the executive branch, and the final terms 
and conditions are limited only by the ingenuity and imagination of 
the negotiators. 
A federal court has no way of assessing how to assemble such a 
combination of terms and conditions in order to resolve an executive 
privilege dispute.  A court has no standards to use in deciding how 
documents will be disclosed, when they will be disclosed, and to 
whom and under what terms they will be disclosed.  The genius of the 
negotiation-accommodation process is that those in the best position 
to assess the impact of all these conditions are the ones who reach a 
final compromise agreement that strikes an acceptable balance far 
more effectively than any court could by its unguided selection of ap-
propriate terms and conditions. 
Thus, what sets executive privilege disputes most clearly apart 
from other separation of powers questions is the remedial complexity 
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of the dispute.  This remedial complexity makes executive privilege 
disputes with Congress unique among separation of powers problems 
and warrants the judicious abstention of courts from attempting to 
impose judicially selected terms and conditions to resolve the dispute.  
Neither O’Neil nor any other advocate of judicial intervention takes 
into account the remedial uniqueness of executive privilege disputes.  
Nor do they explain how a court would be able to achieve the same 
remedial creativity as the negotiation-accommodation process in any 
principled way. 
O’Neil also argues that there is no link between Congress’s wil-
lingness to defend its institutional prerogatives and the constitution-
ally appropriate outcome in a particular case.435  Instead, O’Neil ar-
gues, Congress will pursue its claims only when it is politically 
expedient to do so.436  Therefore, the outcome of executive privilege 
disputes, if left to the negotiation-accommodation process, will be the 
result of these politically expedient calculations and will not reflect 
the proper division of authority as required by the Constitution.437 
The most obvious problem with this argument is that if it is politi-
cally inexpedient for Congress to pursue the negotiations-
accommodation process, then why would it be politically expedient 
for Congress to file litigation to achieve the same result?  The differ-
ence between executive privilege disputes with Congress and every 
other separation of powers or federalism dispute is that only Con-
gress may assert its institutional prerogatives, whether through the 
negotiations-accommodation process or litigation in court.  In other 
separation of powers or federalism disputes, private litigants can be, 
and often have been, the ones to bring the issue before the courts.438  
Therefore, it makes a significant difference whether a court will take 
cognizance of these individual lawsuits or leave the matter entirely to 
the political process.  Individuals may make up for the lack of politi-
cal will on the part of Congress or the President by filing litigation 
that raises the constitutional issue before a court.  That is not the 
case, however, in an executive privilege dispute where, if litigation is 
 
435 See O’Neil, supra note 20, at 1119–29 (casting doubt on the assumption that the self-
executing checks between Congress and the President “will resolve information disputes 
in a manner that best reflects the constitutional balance between the branches”). 
436 Id. at 1122–23. 
437 Id. at 1137. 
438 See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 
U.S. 252 (1991) (suit brought by nonprofit organization); Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361 (1989) (suit brought by criminal defendant); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983) (suit brought by would-be deportee). 
156 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
to be brought, it must be brought by Congress, or at least a commit-
tee authorized by Congress to bring suit. 
Moreover, although the negotiation-accommodation process may 
not always produce the constitutionally optimal division of power, it is 
very likely to produce a constitutionally acceptable resolution and 
one that is far more artfully crafted than any court could produce.  
Stephen Lilley has provided a descriptive model of the political reso-
lution of executive privilege disputes that “rejects claims that political 
compromise generates constitutionally optimal outcomes to executive 
privilege disputes.  It instead identifies a more realistic model for the 
political resolution of executive privilege disputes that focuses on 
constitutionally acceptable outcomes.”439  No one doubts that Antonin 
Scalia was correct when (as head of the OLC) he described the “hur-
ly-burly, the give-and-take of the political process between the legisla-
tive and the executive” that characterizes the resolution of most ex-
ecutive privilege disputes.440  It is the very messiness of these disputes 
that allows the political branches to craft creative solutions that ac-
commodate the interests of each branch.  Congress will press for dis-
closure when it needs disclosure in order to do its job.  Congressional 
motives will inevitably be influenced by politics and its willingness to 
assert its constitutional prerogatives will to some extent reflect these 
political motivations.  But that will be just as true with respect to its 
willingness to press its constitutional prerogatives in court as it is with 
its willingness to do the same through the negotiation-
accommodation process. 
V.  WHEN SHOULD A COURT INTERVENE IN A CONGRESSIONAL 
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE DISPUTE? 
The question remains, however, whether there are any circums-
tances under which a court should step in to resolve and executive 
privilege dispute with Congress.  The answer seems clear based upon 
our constitutional history:  A court should intervene only when the 
parties are not playing within the constitutionally specified bounda-
ries that define the nature of information disputes between Congress 
and the president.  The President has no absolute right to withhold 
documents from Congress, and Congress has no absolute right to de-
termine unilaterally what information the President must divulge.  
 
439 Stephen C. N. Lilley, Suboptimal Executive Privilege, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2009). 
440 Executive Privilege—Secrecy in Government:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-Governmental 
Relations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 94th Cong. 87 (1975) (statement of Antonin 
Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel). 
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Thus, if, through some clever plot, a congressional Sergeant-at-Arms 
were ever able to arrest and imprison an executive branch official for 
asserting the president’s claim of executive privilege, a court should 
declare, in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding, that Congress 
has no right to arrest the official under those circumstances and must 
instead negotiate in good faith to reach an accommodation with the 
executive branch.  Similarly, if the President asserts an absolute privi-
lege and, by failing to disclose even the nature of the documents that 
are being withheld, as President Bush did in connection with the U.S. 
Attorney firings, then a court should rule that the President has no 
absolute right to assert executive privilege and must disclose the na-
ture of the documents withheld in order to begin negotiating fairly 
with Congress. 
In fact, that is precisely what the court did in the Miers case.  Judge 
Bates correctly ruled that Miers was not absolutely immune from tes-
timony before the congressional committee and Bolten was not abso-
lutely privileged from having to produce any information about the 
documents that were being withheld from Congress.441  Then, Judge 
Bates wisely refrained from intervening any further in the dispute, 
and he directed the parties to resume negotiating.442  The Court care-
fully described how limited its role in the dispute would be: 
Indeed, the ultimate disposition that the Court reaches today—that Ms. 
Miers is not absolutely immune from congressional process and that Mr. 
Bolten must produce more detailed documentation concerning privilege 
claims—still does not address the merits of any particular assertion of 
presidential privilege.  Hence, this Court’s intervention is strikingly mi-
nimal, and it is the Court’s sincere desire that it stays that way.  The Court 
strongly encourages the parties to reach a negotiated solution to this dis-
pute.  Quite frankly, this decision does not foreclose the accommoda-
tions process; if anything, it should provide the impetus to revisit negotia-
tions.443 
Thus, in the end, the Miers case does not show that the system for 
resolving executive privilege disputes is broken.  Rather, it shows that, 
when the usual process for resolving executive privilege disputes with 
Congress goes awry because one side claims a unilateral and conclu-
sive right to prevail, the courts will step in in the most limited manner 
to reject claims of constitutional absolutism and redirect the partners 
along the path of the negotiation-accommodation process. 
 
441 See Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 106–07 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that 
former White House counsel was not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity). 
442 Id. at 107. 
443 Id. at 98–99. 
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CONCLUSION 
Congress and the President have important constitutional prerog-
atives that occasionally conflict with one another.  Congress has the 
power to subpoena documents and testimony, and the President has 
the right to maintain the confidentiality of certain information within 
the executive branch.  Each of these prerogatives has a long estab-
lished history, and each has been recognized by the Supreme Court.  
Neither prerogative is absolute, and each must yield under certain 
circumstances. 
The Bush Administration clearly overreached when it claimed that 
White House information concerning the U.S. Attorneys scandal was 
absolutely privileged.  It would be equally problematic, however, for 
Congress to claim that it alone has the absolute right to determine 
the validity of an executive privilege claim.  The proper balance of 
power between the branches would be especially threatened if Con-
gress attempted to utilize its inherent contempt power to imprison an 
official who asserted the President’s claim of executive privilege.  Not 
only is there no historical precedent for congressional use of such a 
coercive sanction against an official who is asserting the President’s 
constitutionally-based privilege, but there is also a long history of dis-
putes between Congress and the President where Congress has effec-
tively acknowledged that it does not possess that power.  Moreover, 
such a power is clearly unnecessary for Congress to enforce its legiti-
mate investigative demands.  Indeed, the history of executive privi-
lege since the Nixon era shows that, if anything, Congress may pos-
sess too much leverage, at least if Congress is controlled by a party 
other than the President’s.  There simply is no need, and no constitu-
tional right, for Congress to decide unilaterally when it should prevail 
in a privilege dispute. 
Instead, Congress and the President have traditionally resolved in-
formation disputes through the negotiation-accommodation process, 
rather than through the assertion of claimed absolute rights.  This 
process works creatively to fashion compromise agreements that in-
volve far more creative and useful terms and conditions than a court 
could ever come up with on a principled basis if it were to attempt to 
adjudicate a congressional-executive information dispute.  Courts 
should step in only when the negotiation-accommodation process 
breaks down because one side has asserted an absolute right to pre-
vail without compromise, and even then only to the extent of reject-
ing claims of absolute constitutional prerogative.  Once the parties 
understand that they have no unilateral right to determine the reso-
lution of such disputes, the negotiation-accommodation process can 
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effectively operate to settle disputes without further resort to the 
judicial process. 
 
 
